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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

CLOSED UNTIL
1977

PART XII

JULY TO DECEMBER 1926

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XII.

[E 4051/59/44] No. 1.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 326.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1926.*

IT is only natural that during the past week the sole subject of political interest in Turkey has been the plot against the life of the President, the discovery of which I reported in my despatch No. 314 of the 23rd instant, and Smyrna has become the centre of all activity.

2. The plot seems to fall naturally into two parts: the first comprises the actual attempt to do murder, and the second, and more problematical, part is that relating to complicities and instigations. On these lines the Independence Tribunal is now proceeding, and it has already begun the trial of a dozen or so of individuals directly concerned in the attempted assassination. Of these, the leader seems to have been one Chukri, Deputy for Ismid, and an active member of the Progressive party; the others were Zia Khurshid, an ex-Deputy of Rize, one or two other Deputies and a handful of cut-throats. These are said to have started their plans last winter, when they thought of doing the deed at Angora, but this was felt to be too difficult a place to escape from. Then, within the last month or so, they thought they might get their victim at Brussa, and one of the cut-throats, Laz Ismail, went there, but having no friends in the town, and not knowing the way around, he returned. Finally, they determined to carry out their designs at Smyrna. Zia Khurshid went off with Laz Ismail and the Georgian Yussef, provided with a letter to a local scoundrel, named Sari Efe Edib, who apparently was quite ready to join in. The conspirators resolved to hire a motor-boat in which to escape after the deed to a Greek island, and Edib brought in a Cretan, named Chefki, who owned such a vessel. It was the latter who finally revealed the plot to the police, perhaps because one of the conspirators went off to Constantinople, and he (Chefki) thought the whole conspiracy was about to be betrayed. The actual murder was to have been done at a certain point in the streets of Smyrna when the Ghazi entered. Bombs and pistols were to have been used. Zia Khurshid himself seems to have had most confidence in pistols. So far as one can make out, the plot was crudely and clumsily contrived, and it strikes one as the work of third-rate politicians, who expected to obtain positions of importance from the revolution that might result from success.

3. As to the other part of the affair—that of complicities and instigations—all that the authorities have done so far is to cast a very wide net and arrest everyone connected with the Progressives. Kiazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad and Refet Pashas have been shipped off to Smyrna. Also Bekir Sami, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who represented the Nationalist Government at the London Conference of March 1921; Faik Bey, a Deputy who was third Turkish delegate to the Mosul Conference at Constantinople in May 1924—he has the misfortune to be the elder brother of Zia Khurshid; Javid Bey has been arrested—the plotters had some money at their disposal and it is assumed that it must have come from Javid; Jaffar Tayar, and many others besides, including every name in the Opposition that you or I had ever heard of, except Adnan Bey, who has been in England for a year, and Reouf, the real leader of the Progressives, who left for Europe at the end of May. Of real

evidence that any of these men has been implicated not one jot has yet transpired, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted to me to-day that, so far as he knew, there was none. The Government, he said, had arrested very freely in order to make sure that none should escape who might be shown by subsequent investigation to have been implicated. Most people consider that the Government is making another effort to kill an Opposition which we all thought had been killed a year ago, and some (though I do not share their view) that the whole thing has been got up from start to finish by the police with a view to encompass the execution of Kiazim Karabekir and Ali Fuad. Whatever the truth may be about the plot, it is quite certain that the Government is feeling exceedingly uncomfortable.

4. When Nuri Pasha Said, the Iraq plenipotentiary, was with me in Angora last month, he called on Rejeb Bey, the Minister of National Defence, with whom he had been a fellow-student at the Staff College. He had been surprised to find the Minister looking so old and worn, and Rejeb, with the bluntness that characterises him, had said: "Yes, I am tired of the whole thing. Do what we will, the Opposition is always growing." It would be going too far to say that the plot is due to discontent, but we are on safer ground in inferring that the vigorous and far-reaching action of the Government in arresting all their critics and political opponents is due to their consciousness of widespread discontent.

5. Let us first glance at the eastern provinces. According to reports by the Administrative Inspector of Mosul, which I have received from Bagdad, the whole country from Mardin to Van is seething with disorder. The Turkish authorities seem strong enough to worry and exasperate Kurdish malcontents, but not strong enough, and certainly not wise enough, to restore tranquillity. Further north things seem pretty bad. Mr. Knight reports from Trebizond that the Bayazid Kurds have destroyed a Turkish battery and dispersed a local regiment; also that deportations of Kurds to more western regions are being carried out on a large scale and in the traditional manner. A Polish traveller who came through to Trebizond from Tabriz saw fighting going on in several places, but unfortunately he was stopped from talking by his Legation before details could be got from him. My Persian colleague tells me that the Turks have stopped all caravan traffic on the Tabriz-Trebizond route at both ends.

6. In Western Anatolia, where government is more strongly organised, open manifestations of discontent are hardly to be encountered at all, but the causes of it can be detected on every side. The hat laws and the closing of "tekkes" caused numerous outbreaks on a small scale last December, but they were easily suppressed by the local authorities. Since then the new Civil Code has been enacted and is on the point of being applied in the courts. It completely revolutionises family law, and it cannot fail to disturb the minds of all inclined to conservative habits of thought. These are moral and sentimental grievances, and, however much resentment they may give rise to, they are hardly likely nowadays, even in Turkey, to cause revolt unless combined with material grievances of a directly sensible nature. These, unfortunately, are not lacking.

7. First, there are the new taxes. For weeks past the papers have published every day long official notices in their advertisement columns explaining to the public in incomprehensible and self-contradictory language how they are to pay the new taxes, and never failing to dwell on the penalties incurred by any default. The tax on profits requires an illiterate people to keep books and accounts; the turnover tax of 2½ per cent. directly affects everyone whoever buys or sells anything; and the entertainment and luxury tax, of 10, 20 or 30 per cent., according to the class of the entertainment or luxury, comes as an unpleasant damper at the end of any kind of jollification. Monopolies ought to work unobtrusively, but in Turkey, owing to clumsy administration, they show themselves very openly indeed. Sugar, petroleum, matches, alcohol are the principal commodities monopolised, and hitherto the experience in every case has been the same. Sugar became so scarce, even in Constantinople, that for a time profiteers could charge what they liked. Crises in petrol supply became so frequent that the sale of Fordson tractors, for which a lively demand had sprung up, was severely checked, and when, a little while ago, the alcohol monopoly came in, for some days it was impossible to buy a bottle of raki (except surreptitiously), because the authorities had not fixed the new sale price. All this is the open advertisement of governmental incompetence; it is unnecessary here to dilate on the ruinous effects these ill-devised and ill-executed measures must have on trade in general. Nor do the new impositions result in a satisfactory financial position for the Government, for, say what it will, work on the railways east from Angora has virtually stopped, and the pay of civil officials is everywhere in arrears.

8. Lastly, I should say the whole Government is losing prestige in company with its head, the Ghazi. The scandal of his private life and habits has become too open to be concealed and is talked of everywhere. Chopur Hilmy, one of the low-class conspirators in the Smyrna plot, said under cross-examination: "They told me that on the day on which they ceded Mosul the Ghazi gave a concert on the "Gul Jemal" (the largest Seiri Sefain steamboat) off Prinkipo. I should be ashamed to repeat the things they told me."

9. The dangerous element in the situation is that the two kinds of discontent now exist together in the country. Men's minds are disturbed by the results of modernisation, and their pockets are touched by the fiscal efforts necessary to carry the Government's programme into execution. I think it likely that before now Turkey has passively suffered this combination of material and moral grievances, but the danger now is greater, because the Ghazi's vigorous programmes have caught the imagination of wide classes and awakened new desires and new interest in government in people who never thought of government before. Revolution is hardly possible without the army's co-operation, and I hear little or nothing of discontent in the army. There is no trace of any military complicity in the Smyrna plot. But that plot and the general observations I have offered above remind us that the present régime in Turkey stands on a very narrow base, and one cannot help concluding that, if it had succeeded, revolution of some sort must ensue.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4053/59/44] No. 2.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 328.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram and two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond, and of extracts from a letter from Mr. Knox, Angora, respecting the situation in Eastern Anatolia.

Constantinople, June 30, 1926.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Copy of Telegram from Trebizond to Constantinople.

(No. 22.) *June 10, 1926.*

I LEARN from a reliable source that Bayazid Kurds, reinforced by compatriots from Persia, revolted about ten days ago destroying a battery and dispersing local regiment.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Consul Knight to Sir R. Lindsay.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Trebizond, June 15, 1926.*

ALL unreliable ex-officers who have become Turkish citizens are being deported to Castamuni from Kars, Igdir and possibly other frontier towns formerly Russian. About twelve families are said to have already reached Castamuni, others are on the way, and remainder are to leave before the 1st July. Deportation which is taking place under circumstances of great hardship is variously attributed to Turkish fear of Bolshevik intrigue, or *vice versâ*, under Soviet pressure.

It is remarkable that White Russian drivers here easily obtain passes for interior, while others who have accepted Soviet protection are refused permission. Thirty Russians with Soviet passports on the way to Batum recently were not allowed to land at Samsun, although White Russian fellow-passengers landed freely.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Consul Knight to Sir R. Lindsay.

(No. 25.)
Sir,

Trebizond, June 16, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 22 of the 10th June, reports from Bayazid indicate that trouble is not yet over, but no very definite idea of events can be formed. A division taken from Kars and Erzeroum (with twelve 6-inch and eight 12-inch guns left by Russians) is said to have been sent to quell the revolt, which was doubtless an attempt to resist deportation. This measure was particularly resented, as Bayazid Kurds had [? not] taken part in last year's rebellion. Travellers report having seen great numbers of Kurds with their families and cattle being driven along Erzeroum–Erzinjin road presumably bound for Angora and Western Anatolia. Whole villages are deserted, and trade is at a standstill over a large area.

I learn from a reliable source that there is now an arsenal at Erzeroum, where shells and rifle cartridges are manufactured.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Extracts from Mr. Knox's Letter from Angora, dated June 17, 1926.

THE Polish Minister tells me that he hears from Suritz that since the signature of the treaty there has been a good deal of very definite talk among responsible Turks of taking in hand an immediate solution on traditional lines of the minority question of the Kurds. He himself (Bader) recently applied for permission for a member of the Polish Legation in Tehran to return to Europe viâ Bayazid, and met with a direct refusal "for military reasons."

June 19, 1926.

In the course of a short conversation with Suritz yesterday I had an opportunity to ask him what his experience was of the practical working of tribal questions on the Turco-Russian frontier. He answered that it was thoroughly discouraging. The Delimitation Commission seemed to make no progress, and there were constant bickerings over grazing lands in spite of the existence of a pasturage convention, which, so far, appeared to be honoured only in the breach. He was in expansive mood, but to my regret our conversation was interrupted.

[E 4059/4059/44] No. 3.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 527.)
Sir,

Rome, June 30, 1926.

TO-DAY'S "Messaggero" publishes the following communiqué issued by the Argentine Legation in Rome:—

"Yesterday at noon a Treaty of Friendship was signed between the Argentine and Turkish Republics, concluded, on the basis of instructions received from the respective Governments, by the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, Suad Bey, and the Argentine Minister Plenipotentiary, Dr. Pérez.

"Signature took place at the Turkish Embassy.

"The treaty in question is a beginning of cordial relations between the two countries, and will permit the establishment of reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation in conformity with international law."

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 4171/4171/44] No. 4.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 339.)
Sir,

Constantinople, July 5, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 328 of the 30th June concerning the Kurdish question, I have the honour to report that Mr. Knox informs me that he has heard from the Albanian Minister at Angora that the Turkish Government are endeavouring to reach an agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government for the transfer to Turkey of the Moslem Albanians of the Kosovo region.

2. It is intended that these immigrants shall take the place of those Kurds who are being deported to Western Anatolia, while the lands of other deported beys are said to have been parcelled out and distributed free to peasants.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 5.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 15, 1926.

YOUR despatch No. 1287 of 10th July: German naval instructors in Turkey.

Precedents quoted are not strictly applicable. In case of Turkey we are not in position to enforce request as with Austria, nor to appeal to friendly relations as with Finland.

I still consider that proposed protest would be ineffective and consequently humiliating.

If other Powers, however, remain unmoved by these considerations, you are authorised to give way.

[E 4287/265/44] No. 6.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 352.)
Sir,

Constantinople, July 12, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. D.O.T. (A) 3 of the 10th November last transmitting copy of a note covering the text of the Turkish draft Budget Law for the year 1926–27, with comparative figures of receipts and expenditure, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum* prepared by the "Service des Renseignements et Etudes financières" of the Ottoman Bank, which was obtained by the commercial secretary to this Embassy.

2. Although the estimates of revenue submitted to the Parliamentary Commission by the Ministry of Finance have been decreased by £T. 28,156,391, the revenue as finally approved by the Assembly, amounting to £T. 190,158,854, compared to that of the preceding budget of £T. 153,046,854, shows an increase of £T. 37,112,000.

3. The basis on which the Parliamentary Budget Commission established the estimates as voted by the Assembly is given in detail in the bank's *exposé*.

* Not printed

4. The increased revenue of £T. 37,112,000 for 1926–27 is derived mainly from the following sources:—

	1925–26. £T.	1926–27. £T.	Increase £T.
The tax on profits	3,500,000	9,000,000	5,500,000
The tax on domestic animals	5,100,500	9,451,000	4,350,500
Succession duties	...	1,000,000	1,000,000
Customs duties	30,000,000	39,000,000	9,000,000
Consumption tax	...	15,000,000	15,000,000
State entertainment tax ...	...	1,000,000	1,000,000
Other consumption taxes ...	16,360,000	21,046,000	4,686,000
Tobacco monopoly	10,500,000	15,000,000	4,500,000
Sugar monopoly	..	4,000,000	4,000,000
Petrol monopoly	..	4,000,000	4,000,000
Spirit revenue: now a monopoly	3,000,000	5,025,000	2,025,000

But, on the other hand, there have been reductions in certain revenues, of which the following are noteworthy:—

	1925–26. £T.	1926–27. £T.	Reduction. £T.
Impôt de guerre	1,000,000	...	1,000,000
Telegraphs	5,550,000	4,500,000	1,050,000
Sale of State property ...	10,000,000	1,000,000	9,000,000
Tax on agricultural products	15,355,000	...	15,355,000

5. It will be observed by reference to the *exposé* that the Parliamentary Commission for the budget in establishing estimates of revenue have taken as a working basis the statistical returns of the preceding year, which serves to a certain extent to form a fairly approximate idea of resources, and in estimating the revenue to be derived from new impositions it cannot be said that the commission has adopted an exaggerated basis, but on the other hand, and this is not uncommon in Turkey, the commission has not made sufficient allowance for the effect the new taxation may have on consumption generally, for there is no doubt that since the application of the new monopolies and of the consumption and State entertainment taxes there has been a marked fall in public demand, and it is doubtful whether the policy of lightening the burden of taxation of the producer at the expense of the consumer will enable the Government to realise the resources which are anticipated.

6. There is a further factor which has to be taken into account. The new taxes by their nature afford many opportunities to the taxpayer to evade contribution. This is particularly marked in respect to the consumption tax.

7. The credits voted by the Assembly amount to £T. 190,091,784 as against £T 188,478,364 (inclusive of supplementary credits voted during the preceding financial year), or an increase of only £T. 1,613,420.

8. The estimates submitted by the Ministry of Finance, amounting to £T. 233,361,930, have been considerably reduced. Practically every department has been obliged to effect economies. The most important reductions affect the Ministries of Public Works, National Defence, Commerce and Agriculture.

9. Compared to the credits voted for the preceding year (including supplementary credits), the Ministry of National Defence and the Customs Administration are the most favoured, for although there has been a reduction of approximately £T. 9,500,000 in the estimates for national defence, the credit allocated to that department exceeds that for the preceding financial year by £T. 17,500,000.

10. Estimated public expenditure is in the following proportion to the total:—

	Percentage of Total Budget.
(*a.*) Internal and External Security—	
Ministry of Defence, &c.	37·0
Gendarmerie	5·5
Public security	2·0
Navy	2·6
Special revenues...	1·6
	48·6

	Percentage of Total Budget.
(*b.*) Development—	
Posts and telegraphs	2·8
Installations	0·8
Health	1·8
Public instruction	4·0
Public works	7·4
Commerce and ports	1·2
Agriculture	2·0
	20·0
(*c.*) Revenue collecting and officialdom—	
President	0·2
G.A.N.T.	0·8
Accounts court	0·3
Commissaires	0·1
Ministry of Finance and Pensions	13·0
Public debt	5·0
Customs	3·0
Cadastral survey	0·6
Interior	2·3
Foreign affairs	1·5
Press	0·4
Religion	0·8
Justice	2·9
	31·4

11. The interesting feature of the budget for the current year lies in the fact that it has been balanced, and a check has, therefore, been put on the practice of presenting a deficitary budget, but no provision has been made to cover the admitted deficit of the preceding year, amounting to £T. 20 million.

12. In previous despatches dealing with Turkish public finances it has been stated that any examination of the budgetary provisions voted by the Assembly was vitiated by the fact that no "compte rendu" was ever presented, or at all events made public, to show to what extent these provisions were actually realised at the end of the financial year.

13. It now appears, however, that some attempt is being made to cover this lacuna, for a "compte rendu," copy of which is attached,* has been presented to the Assembly accounting for revenues and expenditure for the financial year 1923–24.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4420/59/44] No. 7.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 375.)

Constantinople, July 21, 1926.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 326 of the 28th June respecting the attempted assassination of the President, I have the honour to report that the first part of the trial at Smyrna of those implicated ended on the 13th instant. The public prosecutor had asked the Independence Tribunal for the death sentence of eleven of the accused. The court went better than that and condemned fourteen persons to be hanged, including two who have not yet been apprehended. The sentences were pronounced in the afternoon and carried into execution before the following daybreak. When Shukri Bey, perhaps the most important of these criminals, was being hanged, the rope broke, but there was another gallows at hand. He was Deputy for Ismidt, and an old Union and Progress man. He had been Minister of Public Instruction in the Cabinet which launched Turkey into the Great War, and, according to some revelations which the authorities have made, he was the chief organiser of various political assassinations in 1910 and 1911, and at one time tried to effect the removal of Colonel Mustafa Kemal, now the President. Then comes Ismail Jambulat, Deputy for Constantinople, also an

* Not printed.

old Unionist and one of the founders of the now defunct Popular party. Rushdi Pasha's condemnation was something of a surprise. He was a soldier and a general, though not a soldier of particularly high standing; but as Deputy for Erzerum he had taken a prominent part in the parliamentary opposition of 1924. Then there were two or three other Deputies and ex-Deputies, and seven or eight mere ordinary assassins.

2. The acquittals are interesting. They include Bekir Sami, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who attended the London Conference of March 1921 as representative of the Angora Government, and the four generals, Kiazim Karabekir, Reouf, Ali Fuad and Jafar Tayar. The papers had let it be foreseen that the "Pashas" would be let off; but I hear from a very good source that for some days before the end of the trial the authorities had been at pains to make the corps of officers understand that they must keep quiet and that their generals would be acquitted. Even as it was, the execution of Rushdi, a comparatively unimportant figure in the army, caused some little resentment.

3. I see no reason to change the opinion expressed in my earlier despatch—that a plot to assassinate the Ghazi was undoubtedly hatched, and I think most of those hanged deserved their fate. There may well be doubt as to the degree of guilt of some of them, especially of Ismail Jambulat and Rushdi; but apparantly when the conspirators were purposing last winter to bring off their attempt at Angora, a good deal of talk of their plans circulated in the town and some were silent who may have known a good deal. There has been some evidence given that Reouf Bey was told of it. He threatened at once to denounce the whole thing, but apparently did nothing.

4. During the trial the court examined witnesses closely as to the origin of the Progressive party, trying to elicit proof that it was the direct offspring of the "Second Group" of the Parliament of armistice days, which in its turn was the child of the Committee of Union and Progress. I asked Tewfik Rushdi what the point of this was, and he told me that the Unionists used to work entirely by secret committees; that this method of underground politics has become ingrained in the life of Turkish political oppositions, and that the Government is determined to extirpate the evil and will spare no effort to that end. I think Tewfik Rushdi was talking sincerely to me, but it is typically Turkish to forget that when you suppress an opposition, as the Progressive party has been suppressed, you do not abolish it, but you merely drive it underground.

5. Anyhow, the Independence Tribunal arrived at Angora from Smyrna by special train last night, and the curtain now rises on the second scene, viz., the trial of instigators and accomplices. These are Reouf and Adnan Beys, who are abroad and have been summoned to submit to the court. Their answers are not known, but nobody expects them to return to Turkey. Then there is Dr. Nazim, one of the original founders of the Committee of Union and Progress, Rahmi Bey, ex-Vali of Smyrna, and of course Javid Bey, former Minister of Finance. We shall see how the trial proceeds. All I know is that last month when the news of the conspiracy and of the arrests appeared in the morning papers, Javid completely lost his head and a scene of the wildest excitement took place in his house, with all the Deputies of the Progressive party then in Constantinople rushing in and out. This I have from the English servant at that time in Javid's employment.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 4421/59/44] No. 8.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 376.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 21, 1926.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 17th instant I was received in farewell audience by the President of the Republic at his Chankaya residence. The audience was semi-official in character, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs was present in the room throughout, as also the President's chief private secretary and chief aide-de-camp. The Ghazi Pasha spoke to me throughout in Turkish, Tewfik Rushdi acting as interpreter. He devoted himself entirely to broad considerations of Turkish policy, and everything he said aimed at showing how complete was the breach between the Turkey of to-day and that of the past. Nobody, he said, could have believed that the Turk would ever be able to adapt himself to the new conditions,

yet he had done so, and the whole world was surprised at the completeness of the change. He himself had never had any doubt on the point, and had never for a moment lost courage. The first time he had ever worn a hat in public had been at Castamuni, which was the most reactionary town in Anatolia; and yet, within twenty-four hours of his making his speech there on the subject of hats, the inhabitants had all, and without exception, thrown their fezzes to the rubbish heap. But the real change that had taken place had been a change inside and not outside the skulls, for from the envelope it was generally possible to judge of the character of the letter inside it. Turkey was now completely modern and completely Europeanised. In the past the religious element had in every village arrogated to itself the leadership of the community; he had himself, as a young man, noticed this and its ill effects. Similarly, the holy men had exercised their influence on the Central Government, and had thus constituted themselves into the intermediary between the people and the Government with a benumbing effect on the whole policy of the State. All this organisation of the past was now shattered, and under the republic there was direct contact between governors and governed. The ideas of the past had been essentially illogical and were now discarded. There were parties still hankering after these old illogical policies, working for them abroad; doubtless I knew to what he was referring. When he had begun to assume the leadership in Turkey they had been the first to approach him and try to win him to their ways of thought. He had refused from the first to have anything to do with them. Just as the Ottoman Empire was the direct descendant of the Seljuk Kingdoms, so these parties were the direct descendants of the Ottoman Empire, but they were now smashed, and the breach with the past was complete and could never be closed again. So too in foreign policy. The tortuous methods of the Sublime Porte had been discarded, and for them had been substituted new relations of perfect frankness and sincerity. He was glad to think that relations with Great Britain were now open and sincere. The Ottoman Empire had always desired territory. The Powers of Europe could to-day feel perfectly confident that the Turkish Republic had no desire for territory merely for its own sake. He would quote the Yemen as an example. When the war ended there was still in the Yemen Turkish troops and a complete Turkish Administration in being. These men had sent to him asking to be taken over and acknowledged by the republic, and his answer had been that the republic had no use for them where they were, and they were doing no good to Turkey.

2. I had looked forward to this interview in the hope that it would give me an opportunity of some real talk with the President, and I was rather disappointed at the formal ceremonial which eventually surrounded it. I am afraid, therefore, that the conversation was intrinsically dull, and little passed that I did not know before and that I have not reported to you already. What was interesting was the general direction given to his talk by the President. Most of it was indeed common place; much of it is illogical and even false, but I really believe that he was sincerely convinced of the truth of all he said, and that I had before me a man making a long speech to me about the subject nearest his heart. He has worked passionately for the modernisation of Turkey; he believes genuinely that he has achieved his aim; and so far as foreigners and foreign Powers are concerned he longs for them to believe that they are faced with a new Turkey with a new mentality, which deserves to be treated with the confidence, trust and intimacy which European Powers can sometimes feel as between each other. It is easy to see the falsity of his premises and the weakness of his inferences, and to doubt respectfully whether, by changing the envelope, you alter the character of the letter inside it; in one respect certainly Turkey is changed, "radicalement," as he kept saying, a word for which there is no exact Turkish equivalent, and that is in the predominance in the state of himself.

3. Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonica in 1880. There are numerous tales as to his ancestry, but the following is the best authenticated that I have heard, and it receives some confirmation in the official biography. His father was an obscure young pure-blooded Albanian from Dibra, named Ali Reza. The men of Dibra are a peculiar race, enterprising, emigrating freely to other lands and towns, keen merchants, greedy of gain, ambitious and persistent, hard, and vengeful. Young Ali Reza accordingly emigrated to Salonica, where he found employment in the offices of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. He left this post and set up as a wood merchant. He then married a Turkish woman and the young Mustafa was born. Immediately after Ali Reza died, and immediately after that the widow married a Turkish officer, so that Mustafa, a pure Albanian in appearance and a true Dibriot in character was brought up as a Turk, and never learned a word even

of the Albanian language—an interesting combination of heredity and environment. Another tale, told me by Ferid Bey, Turkish Ambassador in London, is that Mustafa Kemal comes of an old Turkish family settled in the Morea, and virtually exterminated in the war of liberation. Mustafa's immediate forbear escaped and settled just outside the boundaries of the new Greek State, and when in the forties the Greek frontier was advanced further north, our Turk instantly picked himself up again and settled in Salonica, where, with his family, he continued to live in honourable but reduced circumstances. I am inclined to think that this tale of Ferid's relates to Mustafa's mother or step-father.

4. Young Mustafa Kemal had the ordinary education of a Turkish officer, and distinguished himself in the classes of the military school. All his life his personality has given him a conspicuous position among his comrades, and always, even in early days, he has been addicted to drunken and other orgies. At one time his eyesight was seriously menaced as a bye-result of syphilis. He has never really reconciled himself to the leadership of any person, and quite young he got interested in the progressive movement. The very day he was appointed staff-captain he was summoned to Yildiz and underwent several days' cross-examination. He was saved from exile to Yemen by being smuggled off to Damascus by friends. He served in Tripoli with Enver and quarrelled with him. In Tripoli he captured some Italian guns and painted his name on them. Later, in the military museum at Constantinople, he found these guns labelled as the capture of Enver Pasha, and with his own hands then and there he erased Enver's name and substituted his own. He sought out the director of the museum, and told him what he had done, and the amended inscription remained thenceforward. This was typical of his relations with Enver, which became so strained that things became too hot for him, and this time he was saved by Fethi Bey, an old friend, who was then Minister at Sofia, and took him as military attaché. Before the war he was anti-German, and conducted quite a campaign in favour of depending on France for munitions and supplies of all sorts. Perhaps this was merely the reaction of a masterful mind against a domineering race, but he has maintained that he was opposed to Turkey's entering the Great War. In it he had important commands, but he did not get on with Germans, and it was to get him out of the way that he was sent to Germany in the suite of Vehiduddin, after which, till the very last stage of the war, he was on the shelf. It is a puzzle how such a man can have been selected to tame the rising tide of Nationalism in Anatolia. A word of warning about him was passed to Damad Ferid at the last moment, but he passed it off, saying, "he is a Turkish officer and a gentleman, and it will be all right."

5. Mustafa Kemal is really an anachronism. With his energy, determination and ruthlessness he should have been a Gengis Khan or a Hulagu, leading victorious hordes over continents, and filling in the intervals between campaigns with hideous debauches of wine and women. As it is, there is not scope enough for his animal spirits. The debauches are carried on almost openly, and in the intervals he is almost bored by the comparatively petty play of politics. His iron constitution enables him to stand the one, and undoubted patriotism keeps him at work on the other, but he is hardly reconciled to his lot by the wealth he has acquired, of which he undoubtedly and perhaps rightly considers himself fully deserving.

6. In person he is about 5 feet 4 or 5 inches tall, strongly built, but moves lightly. Light brown hair, now getting rather thin on the top. Grey-green eyes, with a slight cast in them, which gives him a rather sinister expression. Clean shaven, strong regular features, bushy eyebrows. Thin straight lips, closing tight and indicative of determination, hardness, even cruelty. In talking there is much facial play, but it is difficult to see in him any charm or personal magnetism such as one would expect from a true leader. Perhaps he has always been a driver rather than a leader of men.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4532/43/44] No. 9.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 393.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 28, 1926.*

MY Italian colleague informs me that a short time ago, since the signature of the Iraq Frontier Treaty of the 5th June, a protocol additional to the Russo-Turkish Treaty of the 17th December was signed by M. Suritz and Tewfik Rushdi Bey by which the two parties declare that up to the date of signature neither party had entered into any engagements contrary to the treaty. I had never heard about this additional protocol, and not a word about it transpired in the Turkish press, but the Russian News Agency seems to have given the intelligence to the Italian Agency, and a telegram reproducing it was printed in some Italian papers. Signor Orsini Baroni, last time he saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said to him point-blank: "So you have signed another protocol with the Russians." Tewfik Rushdi looked at him with some astonishment and said, "Comment savez-vous cela?" but admitted the truth of the observation.

2. In my opinion the Soviet Government, in requiring the signature of such a document, desired to have an assurance that there were no secret articles attached to the Iraq Frontier Treaty. The Turks would sign such a protocol, derogatory though it may be to their dignity, in order to keep the Russians quiet and to preserve their balance between north and south, which, it might be suspected, was menaced by the solution of the Iraq frontier question.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4591/37/44] No. 10.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2215.)
My Lord Marquess, *Foreign Office, August 4, 1926.*

I TOOK the opportunity afforded me by the French Ambassador's call this morning on other matters to speak to him about the position disclosed by Sir Ronald Lindsay's telegram No. 102 of the 24th July. I reminded the Ambassador that some time ago he had asked that we should join the French Government in making representations to the Turks about their treatment of the bondholders; that at that moment we had been engaged in negotiations for the Mosul Treaty and I had explained that I was unwilling to introduce any new disturbing factor into those negotiations but that I should be ready to join with the French Government as soon as the negotiations were finished; that the Ambassador had reminded me of this promise after the conclusions of the negotiations and I had then agreed to instruct Sir Ronald Lindsay to concert with his French and Italian colleagues as to the best form in which to make these representations. It now appeared, however, from what the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to Sir Ronald Lindsay that, as far back as the beginning of June, he had made proposals to the French Government. That this was so had been confirmed to Sir Ronald by the French Chargé d'Affaires who, however, was not in a position to explain what the proposals were as the Ambassador had gone to Paris to report about them without leaving them on record in Constantinople. I told M. de Fleuriau that this news had affected me rather unpleasantly. I thought I was entitled to expect that, when I had agreed to take concerted action with the French, they would not carry on negotiations upon the same subject without informing me of what they were doing.

M. de Fleuriau expressed complete surprise and incredulity. He was confident, from information which he had from time to time received, that no such negotiations had taken place, and that no proposal had been made except that which was made directly to the bondholders and which had been found nsa tisfactory by them.

In that case I said that Tewfik Rushdi Bey must have misinformed Sir Ronald. The Ambassador repeated that he was sure he could trust his memory for the accuracy of what he had said, but he would, of course, take steps to clear the matter up.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 4662/59/44] No. 11.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 404.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 4, 1926.*

IN his despatch No. 375 of the 21st July, Sir R. Lindsay reported that of the fourteen persons condemned to death for participation in the plot against the life of the Ghazi, two had not yet been apprehended.

2. During the course of last week one of them, Kara Kemal Bey, was traced to a house in Stambul, where he shot himself as he was on the point of being arrested. Abdul Kadir is still at large. The importance which the Government attach to these two men is shown by the fact that a reward of £T. 10,000 was offered for information leading to their arrest and special penalties threatened against any persons who might harbour them.

3. Kara Kemal was at the outbreak of the revolution a minor employee in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. He rapidly rose to power as a member of the inner ring of the Committee of Union and Progress, and during the war acquired great wealth and correspondingly great power as Director of Supplies. During the occupation of Constantinople he was deported to Malta, whence he escaped. Since then he had ostensibly taken no interest in politics, but it is believed that the fortune which he had acquired was at the disposal of the Committee of Union and Progress.

4. Abdul Kadir is a man of no special prominence; he was Vali of Angora in 1921, when he was dismissed by Mustafa Kemal.

5. The trial of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress has begun at Angora, some slight delay having been caused by the absence of the Public Prosecutor. Meantime, a number of persons have been released. In opening the proceedings the Public Prosecutor asked for life sentences in a fortress against thirteen of the accused, including Javid; Russein Jahid, the journalist; Dr. Nazim Raouf; Adnan; and Rahmi, ex-Vali of Smyrna.

6. If the proceedings of the first two days can be regarded as affording any indication, the trial will last a long time, as the intention of the court appears to be to extract detailed information regarding the aims and activities of the Committee of Union and Progress from the time of the armistice onwards, and finally to discredit the opposition by convincing the public that all its leaders have been discreditably connected with the Committee of Union and Progress.

7. I have just received a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting that "there is at present an important movement of scission in the army, a great part of which (I am told a majority) is forming a party, the chosen leader of which is Kiazim Karabekir Pasha. The latter is said to be endeavouring to dissuade his would-be adherents from forming this party and to induce them to maintain the unity of the army."

8. This report confirms and amplifies the information in paragraph 2 of Sir R. Lindsay's despatch under reference indicating that the corps of officers had shown signs of unrest during the Smyrna trial. It also confirms Rejeb Bey's pessimistic utterance (See Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 326 of the 28th June) "Do what we will, the opposition is always growing."

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4663/35/44] No. 12.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 405.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 4, 1926.*

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 892 of the 8th December last concerning the renunciation of their rights by the minorities of Turkey, I have the honour to report an announcement that the Jews of Turkey have decided to give up their rights under article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

2. A meeting of the Jewish National Assembly was held on the 1st August, at which some seventy Jewish notables were present, including the Grand Rabbi. M. Marco Nahoum, on behalf of the Committee of Reorganisation, known as the Committee of Thirteen, proposed to the Assembly to attach to the "Mazbata" lately presented to the Government on the subject of Jewish family status a declaration of renunciation of minority rights. A commission of five was appointed to present this declaration to the Turkish Government and to beg them to issue some organic statute for the administration of the whole community.

3. This declaration has not yet been published, but it is believed to state that the Jewish community, convinced of the uselessness of minority rights in the heart of a free and equal republic and considering that the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers has already been achieved, renounces the minority rights conferred upon it by the Treaty of Lausanne.

4. The declaration was signed by every member of the Assembly, and is to be presented to the Government as soon as the signatures of other leading Jews shall have been secured.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4795/37/44] No. 13

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 416.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note sent to Nusret Bey on the 5th August, 1926, respecting the proposed resumption of negotiations between the Turkish Government and the bondholders.

Constantinople, August 11, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Hoare to Nusret Bey.

Excellence, *Constantinople, le 5 août 1926.*

LES négociations qui, conformément aux résolutions prises à Lausanne, avaient été poursuivies entre le Gouvernement turc et les porteurs pour le règlement définitif de la question de la dette publique ottomane ont été suspendues au mois de mai dernier. Un plus long arrêt dans les pourparlers étant de nature à porter préjudice à tous les intérêts en présence, mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de vous prier d'attirer l'attention de son Excellence Tewfik Rouchdi Bey sur l'avantage que présenterait, à tous égards, la prompte reprise des négociations dont il s'agit.

Le Gouvernement britannique, persuadé qu'il ne fait en cela que prévenir le désir du Gouvernement turc, exprime donc l'espoir que la délégation turque chargée de la conduite des pourparlers sera invitée à reprendre ses travaux à une date rapprochée; il est, d'autre part, convaincu que les instructions qui seront données à cette délégation seront telles qu'elles permettront d'arriver promptement à un accord dont le Gouvernement britannique, dans toute la mesure qu'il lui était permis de le faire, a cherché de son côté à faciliter la conclusion.

Veuillez, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

E 4927 37 44

No 14.

Mr Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received August 23)

(No 430)

Sir,

Constantinople August 16, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No 416 of the 31st August regarding the resumption of negotiations between the Turkish Government and the bondholders for the liquidation of the Ottoman Public Debt I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs raised this question with the French Chargé d'Affaires at Angora a few days ago His Excellency said that it was understood that the French Government had proposed the resumption of negotiations on the 15th September He was personally going into the question and was almost confident that negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion in about a month As I gathered from what he said to the Turkish Ambassador in Paris to establish personal contact with the Council of the Bondholders Lewis Rendel Bey made some attempt to discuss details with M Bargeton and suggested that another 2nd London meeting should be arranged to which the Foreign Bondholders Whole-Interest Group might send representatives to the settlement of this question who Lewis Rushdi Bey had described as one of the outstanding difficulties of the Turkish Government Bargeton declared himself to be quite incompetent for such technical matters and was rather taken aback when I asked whether a reply might shortly be expected to the despatch sent in response to Lewis Rushdi Bey's request for a new London meeting

2 I took occasion throughout the discussion to emphasize the fact that Turkish offer was to be treated as a matter of extreme urgency and therefore I gathered from Bargeton's observations that Lewis Rendel Bey's professions are sincere

3 In connexion with the above I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the text of a telegram which has been received from the Turkish Government in reply to the request which I addressed to them on the instructions contained in your despatch No 380 of the 20th May last for the publication of the Turkish Government's White Book on the Smyrna plot

I have &c

R H HOARE

E 4929 59 44

No 15.

Mr Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received August 23)

(No 433)

Sir,

Constantinople August 18, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No 404 of the 4th instant I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been prepared by Mr Helm summarising the proceedings as reported in the press at the trial of the accused members of the Committee of Union and Progress at Angora This record covers the period from the beginning of the trial on the 2nd August down to the 16th August

2 Reports of this trial with commentaries which in England would entail severe penalties for contempt of court fill almost half of the local papers day by day Press freedom is a misleading term in Turkey for the only definition known is that the sole function of the press is to support Mustafa Kemal and indeed almost fanatical desire to modernise Turkey on the totalitarian Soviet model possibly even more whole-heartedly than that of Abdul Hamid the Damned

3 The trial at Smyrna took what is left to attempt to comment on the penalties imposed were indeed savage Judicial murder was legal in Turkey as in other countries and was allowed to stand until the evidence was carefully sifted and weighed Constantinople was not quite the East from which Angora has emerged But in Smyrna enough of the Levantine has survived to make it quite clear that a rough justice was being administered As Mr Helm indicates at the end of those notes during the trial and after the sentences of death the whole of the Turkish Press has been full of the personal contact with the prisoners of the President and his friends

* Not printed

court that opposition is essentially and inevitably criminal in character I hear from Angora that Ismet Pasha cherishes the hopeless aspiration of eliminating the Opposition for good and all and yet the Government have not dared to arrest Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha though they have summoned him to give evidence at the trial The present regime has not the savage energy and unity of action which enabled the Soviet Government to establish itself nor the inspiration and genius by which Signor Mussolini has erected an autocracy based largely on consent It is a flimsy edifice and yet it would be rash to prophesy its early downfall

I have &c

R H HOARE

Enclosure in No 15

Memorandum by Mr Helm

THE present trials arise out of the plot discovered at Smyrna in June against the life of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and as a result of which thirteen persons were hanged on the 14th July In that grim setting its verdict the Independent Tribunal sitting at Angora on other alleged conspirators who according to the official prosecution were the real instigators of the plot to obtain the object of which bombs were used by the disappointed rivals the President to the complete overthrow of the régime which he has established The trial began on the 2nd August and the proceedings of the Committee of Union and Progress, though well known and favourably known Minister Ismail the elder crypto-Jew who has seen service in Turkey since Russia ruled Former President of the Constantinople Chamber of Deputies and Young Turk pioneer and editor and Press censor in the last years of the Empire who was virtually Foreign Minister of the Committee of Union and Progress Dr Nazim ex-Minister of Finance Jemal Pasha ex-Minister of Marine Djavid Bey ex-Minister of Finance Colonel Tahir Constantinople Commandant during the war Colonel Edib Chief of the Staff of the Union Committee Sukru Bey Kiazim Pasha and Kara Vehbi Bey Mutesarrif of Erzerum have naturally refused to attend the proceedings

2 The tribunal consists of three members and the presidency of Ali Bey, Deputy for Afion Kara Hissar, to whom as a matter of personal interest I refer in the opening of the trial the depositions of the accused had been drawn out upon the opening speech of the prosecutor the work of the prosecutor as well as the cross-examination has been conducted almost entirely by the president who thus has been at liberty to give the proceedings that flavour which he desired Although in theory the accused may be permitted the assistance of counsel, this is not allowed in practice, and it is understood that the only opportunity to be afforded for defence will be on the final day of the trial when the accused will be at liberty to make short statements on their own behalf This is the procedure established at Smyrna

3 The trial opened on the 2nd instant, when the prosecutor delivered his address to the tribunal He referred to the Smyrna plot, which, he said, could not have been the work of the smaller party already condemned but was rather evidence of the machinations of greater brains working secretly and with ramifications over the whole country Evidence would be produced to show how the Committee of Union and Progress had been at work ever since the armistice with the object of forming an opposition and returning to power, and how this party would not have scrupled to sacrifice the national interest in order to secure their aim What such methods the worst could be expected to be therefore and he hesitated in stating that the accused were the real instigators of the plot in making clear their condemnation

4 The court has sat daily each of the accused being examined in turn and alone The president's questions have been conducted in moderately polite language and there seems to have been almost an extra observance of behaving though Ali Bey has had no hesitation in saying when he considered any of the accused was lying The replies of the accused have been straightforward and there has been little conflict of evidence and that of David Bey in particular has seemed unduly clever

5 The object of the court has been to obtain as complete a record as possible of the connexion of each of the accused with the Committee of Union and Progress and in this way one of the hidden histories of the last twelve years has been, at last

* Reference was made in paragraph 3 of this despatch to a telegram which was sent to Constantinople in despatch No 380 of the 20th May 1925

revealed. It has, for instance, been unanimously stated that the alliance of Turkey with Germany in 1914 was the work solely of Said Halim, Enver and Talaat Pashas, and that the Central Committee of the party at large and the Cabinet were kept entirely in the dark and only confronted with the *fait accompli*. This is the desire of the Germanists of whom Talaat was apparently not so much enamoured as his two colleagues. Said was not given the prestige of splendid opportunity to risk, perhaps with his life, the gamble as to whether there was to Constantinople and whether the Sultan approved the single-handed action of three former exiles. In this connection the interesting revelation was made that the Turkish copy of the Turco-German Treaty of Mudros of 1914 disappeared soon after its conclusion and that the most careful searches at Turkish Archives during the war and since have failed to recover any trace of it.

It is, of course, open to question whether the court erected to try the late Kara Kemal Beyand Dr. Nazim as the chief culprits. The accused were therefore closely questioned regarding their relations with these two former Committee of Union and Progress leaders. Much light was thrown on the way in which the Ministry of Supply set up by Kara Kemal was appointed by Talaat Pasha. Kemal, it will be recalled, suffered from a chronic lack of funds. The British Government refused to release the early post-Armistice remittances to Constantinople, and Kemal was therefore compelled to look around for other sources of revenue. Among the wealthy men who had made large profits out of the War was Nazim, who was induced to finance the Ministry of Supply to the extent of £T.2,000,000. In return for this he was given a number of contracts for the supply of foodstuffs to the Army, which the court heard were carried out.

7. Here it is necessary briefly to refer to the Pan-Islamic movement which played so important a part in the Nationalist campaign. It is not known whether the Sultan-Caliph was privy to the plot which led to the murder of Enver, Talaat and Said, but it is certain that he was in close touch with the Nationalist Government at Angora. Since the early post-Armistice days Mustafa Kemal had been in communication with the Sultan through Mehmed Emin Bey, the Sultan's Secretary, and Ali Fuad Bey, who was sent to Angora with the latest news of the Palace intrigues. Ali Fuad Bey, who is now Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, was one of the Nationalist leaders who signed the Moscow Treaty of March 1921. Mehmed Emin Bey, who is now Deputy for Kastamuni, was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Ahmed Izzet Pasha, which succeeded the Damad Ferid Ministry in October 1918. He was also Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Tewfik Pasha, which succeeded the Izzet Ministry in March 1919. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha, which succeeded the Tewfik Ministry in October 1919. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Rechid Pasha, which succeeded the Ali Riza Ministry in March 1920. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, which succeeded the Rechid Ministry in October 1920. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha, which succeeded the Damad Ferid Ministry in March 1921. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Rechid Pasha, which succeeded the Ali Riza Ministry in October 1921. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha, which succeeded the Rechid Ministry in March 1922. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Rechid Pasha, which succeeded the Ali Riza Ministry in October 1922. He was Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha, which succeeded the Rechid Ministry in March 1923. 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[illegible] to drag the case to a close as fast as possible, and to get a verdict as nearly on the same lines as the Jury must answer both questions, the discrediting of the Committee of Union and Progress *per se*, and the question whether or not they probably included a body of persons who were acting that Mustafa Kemal Pasha will not brook opposition in any manner whatsoever and that all who are part or parcel of any of those who have plotted against his person must pay the penalty. The Public Prosecutor in the opening of the trial stated that the sentiment of the thirteen leaders but it may be that the fourth accused, Ali Shukri Bey, who admitted to the press on his arrival here that he was going to his death, will be the only one to suffer the extreme penalty.

I have, &c.
V. K. H.

[illegible] December 17, 1926.

E 5141/59/44

No. 16

Sir, Ankara to Sir A. Chamberlain.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 1054.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 30, 1926.

With reference to my Despatch No. 1441 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum by Mr. H. Bryans on the closing stages of the trial of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders at Angora.

2. As soon as the proceedings at this trial are made public in full, Mr. Bryans will, I trust, be able to furnish me with a more detailed report on the subject than I can at present hope to obtain.

3. Mr. Bryans' account of his adventures on this trip will have added interest for those of the younger members of the Service who have yet to learn the rudiments of their calling. It is a pity that Mr. Bryans' modesty should have prevented him from giving us a full account of his experiences, but I am sure that we are to regard the events here recorded as a report on such publication as the Board of Trade Journal, and I expect merely and strictly to comment on the manner in which Mr. Bryans has carried out the duties entrusted to him.

4. Mr. Bryans' success in obtaining the confession of Djavid Bey, which was the principal object of his journey, will have added considerably to the value of the trial, and I am glad to think that the Turkish Government will be grateful to him for the manner in which he has carried out his mission.

5. Having regard to the importance which the Turkish Government attach to the trial of the thirteen leaders, I consider that Mr. Bryans' presence at Angora during the whole of the proceedings was desirable, and I am glad to think that he was able to be present at the delivery of the judgment.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

E 5141/59/44

No. 16

Memorandum.

My journey to Angora was undertaken at the request of Sir R. Hoare, and I left Constantinople on the 16th August.

2. During the following week the time of the Court was taken up with the examination of the various witnesses, and other less important members of the former Committee of Union and Progress, but the evidence of these did not throw any further light on the fundamental question at issue, and was of little importance except in the case of the leaders.

3. When the completed text of the cross-examination was received from the shorthand writers, which I did on the 23rd instant, I began at once to peruse it, but found it impossible to do more than glance at the pages, as Ali Shukri Bey, one of the thirteen accused, had asked to see me, and I was engaged with him for the greater part of the day. Ali Shukri Bey, who had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the head of the Police Department in Salonika, was one of those who had been implicated in the plot against the life of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and was one of the thirteen leaders who were to be brought to trial. He was, I believe, a personal friend of Djavid Bey, and was also a relative of Halil Bey, another of the accused. He had been arrested at Smyrna, and brought to Angora, and was, I think, under the impression that he was to be tried as a witness only. He was, however, informed on his arrival that he was to be tried with the others, and was placed in a cell with Djavid Bey, who was in the next cell to mine. Ali Shukri Bey was very much upset at finding himself in the dock with the thirteen leaders, and was anxious to know what line he should take in his defence. He told me that he had been arrested at Smyrna, and had been brought to Angora, and had been told that he was to be tried as a witness only. He had been informed on his arrival that he was to be tried with the others, and was very much upset at finding himself in the dock with the thirteen leaders, and was anxious to know what line he should take in his defence. He told me that he had been arrested at Smyrna, and had been brought to Angora, and had been told that he was to be tried as a witness only. He had been informed on his arrival that he was to be tried with the others, and was very much upset at finding himself in the dock with the thirteen leaders, and was anxious to know what line he should take in his defence.

4. Djavid Bey, before Mustafa Kemal was the first to be examined. It was slow work as he had been cleverly schooled in his evidence, and was nervous lest a word or action regarding Ibrahim should escape him. He was interested in politics, and therefore asked Nejad Ali Bey to impress on Ibrahim that Djavid Bey could not have had any share in the plans of Kara Kemal or Abdul Kadir's guilty.

5. Djavid Bey had been Minister of Finance when Abdul Kadir was deputy-director of the Police, and had been sent to Erzerum by Abdul Kadir to keep Kara Kemal under observation, but he was not a party to their plans.

6. Djavid Bey was questioned by me on the evidence given by Ali Shukri Bey, and he admitted that he had been informed by Ali Shukri Bey that Kara Kemal had been arrested at Smyrna, and that he had been brought to Angora, and that he was to be tried as a witness only. He had been informed on his arrival that he was to be tried with the others, and was very much upset at finding himself in the dock with the thirteen leaders, and was anxious to know what line he should take in his defence. He told me that he had been arrested at Smyrna, and had been brought to Angora, and had been told that he was to be tried as a witness only. He had been informed on his arrival that he was to be tried with the others, and was very much upset at finding himself in the dock with the thirteen leaders, and was anxious to know what line he should take in his defence.

judgment itself was of considerable length. Its first part was for all practical purposes a summing up of the evidence in support of the accusation. The second part was once more thrown back on the events of the war and aroused the old cost an effort was made by the insertion of quotations which had not been given in the course during the trial to bridge the gap between October 1921 and June 1926 which had so completely baffled the Public Prosecutor. Both last documents were then read out and handed over to the Court. Both last documents were then read out and handed over to the Court. Both last documents were then read out and handed over to the Court.

[illegible] noted in the [illegible] that the [illegible] Code the [illegible] to [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] which [illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible] to

E 5147 37 44 No. 16

Mr Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain *Received September 6*

(No. 167)

Sir *Constantinople, September 1, 1926*

ON receipt of your despatch No. 192 of the 7th August concerning the settlement of the dispute between Turkey and Italy and Italian resignation of membership of the League, I addressed a letter to the Turkish Government of which I enclosed a copy in my despatch No. 166 of the 31st August, expressing the hope that the negotiations which were then proceeding at Angora might result in a settlement of the dispute.

I have, &c.
(For the Chargé d'Affaires)
CLIVE

Enclosure in No. 7

Note from Mr. Clive

Monsieur le Ministre, *Constantinople, August 31, 1926*

[illegible] Excellence [illegible] Gouvernement Turc [illegible] Gouvernement Italien [illegible] Société des Nations [illegible] Gouvernement Turc [illegible] Gouvernement Italien [illegible] Gouvernement Turc [illegible] Gouvernement Italien [illegible] Gouvernement Turc [illegible] Gouvernement Italien

[illegible] that it was impossible for me to give any assurance of the kind [illegible] in any way pledge [illegible] Assembly with regard to the decision to be taken [illegible] would strongly urge the British Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude [illegible] the country but by appropriate conditions [illegible] to the good will of Europe, the security and Europe's own interests as well as [illegible] to be considered.

Right Hon. Sir [illegible] not intend to speak but to consider the time I repeated that we, technically [illegible] were concerned we would give most prompt [illegible] Germany. Trade conditions there [illegible] Spain. An [illegible] matter [illegible] this is to we [illegible] only treaty [illegible] Belgium [illegible] negotiations [illegible] But to be ready to consider the [illegible] The Preparatory Committee [illegible] composition [illegible] Government [illegible] Britain [illegible] to Assembly Powers. Delegates [illegible] Powers at Geneva [illegible] would [illegible] Assembly [illegible] Powers [illegible] Rules of Procedure [illegible] Committee [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] only draw the conclusion that the Turkish Government [illegible] to withdraw at the idea that it would be rather [illegible] by the Western Powers, and that it would be equally [illegible] and the invitation to enter into discussion with the offer [illegible]

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

E 5620 298 44 No. 24

Sir H. Hoare to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received October 4)

(No. 218.)

Constantinople, September 29, 1926.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to report that they were being taken to contribute [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] to provide Turkey with credit [illegible] by the Ottoman Press and reports having arrived to renew [illegible] of trade with particular reference to cotton, substantial [illegible] and beet [illegible] from the U.S.S.R. I have therefore protested against this favoured [illegible] and pointed out that, under Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty, [illegible] are entitled to claim.

2. At the moment, however, the Turkish Government [illegible] to conclude [illegible] which does not include [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] the latter [illegible] to the Ottoman Government [illegible] Government [illegible] to the Turkish Government [illegible] to the Ottoman Government [illegible] to the Turkish Government [illegible] to the Ottoman Government [illegible] to the Turkish Government [illegible] to the Ottoman

Appendix 2

(Translation)

La Ligue de l'Aviation a pris dans son dernier congrès les décisions dont j'ajoint le texte

En vue de l'application de ces décisions, des agents désignés par la Ligue de l'Aviation siégent à côté des fonctionnaires du sultan dans les bureaux de perception, et lorsque le reçu de l'impôt payé est établi il est remis par ces fonctionnaires aux agents qui prennent note de cette délivrance pour être contre-versement par le contribuable des taxes à payer à la Ligue pour les quelles il est également délivré reçu

Par là est assez clairement que cette perception n'est basée sur aucun texte légal

La Ligue de l'Aviation est une association qui se crée veut est reconnue d'utilité publique et peut autoriser à recueillir les souscriptions et les donations dans un but d'intérêt général, mais ne peut percevoir des sommes additionnelles

Les souscriptions et versements ne peuvent pas être obligatoires

Le projet peut donc être retiré dans l'esprit de contribuable du fait de la [illegible] qui est suivie d'un encouragement à prêter aux bureaux et fins aux agents de la Ligue

Pour cette dernière il pourrait exister contre la possibilité ou à la légalité de cette perception mais il suffit de se référer à l'article 5 du Décret No 161 du 29 septembre 1336 1920 interdisant les souscriptions légales, il est libellé comme suit

> Toute personne qui aura été exposée à des poursuites pour le paiement de souscriptions ou autres contributions ou commissions de la même nature

Constitution Ottomane No 191 du 20 avril 1340 1924 Charte [illegible] protège la liberté des cultes et

> Il est interdit à quiconque de [illegible] peuple aux biens généraux de l'Etat [illegible] de percevoir aucune taxe ou impôt sous quelque dénomination que ce soit à l'exception de ceux qui sont prélevés par les autorités locales et autres taxes

Constantinople le 10 *janvier* 1926

E 5856 226 44 No. 22

Sir L. Oliphant to Mr. H. de C. Montgomery (Constantinople)

(No. 860)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1926

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador has just been with me. As I expected he had sought the interview in order to obtain my views as to what part Turkey had played in the conversation which I held with Signor Mussolini at Leghorn. He prayed that the conversation papers to whose opinions he did not attach too much importance, had suggested that Italy had made overtures to other Powers in the Near East and in Asia Minor, and he enquired whether I had any information on the matter or whether I could indicate to him what had been Signor Mussolini's attitude towards Turkey. I informed him that in the course of my long conversation with Signor Mussolini there had been only the briefest reference to Turkey. Signor Mussolini had observed that the policy of Turkey was a very strange one, but I had given no expression of opinion as to its objectives. I was disposed to think that Italy was very unimpressed by its tendencies. This was practically all that had passed between us on the subject.

The Ambassador said that he was not surprised that Signor Mussolini should think Turkish policy strange, for the intentions of Italy towards Turkey were therefore obscure, and Turkish policy towards Italy could not but be influenced by this fact. He was surprised and pained that I should feel any doubt about His Government's intentions.

I said that I would explain my meaning to him more fully. If for this purpose I recalled the history of the last few years it was not now to criticise or blame the Turkish attitude but merely to paint the historical background of my present feelings. In the years following the armistice the Turkish Government had withdrawn into Asia. It had not ratified the treaty signed at Sevres, and even when a new and much more favourable treaty was signed at Lausanne, Turkey had still maintained her isolation. I must confess that I had never understood her attitude in the Mosul dispute and particularly her attitude towards the League of Nations. The effect had been to exaggerate her isolation, so that we had as it were Turkey on the one hand and all Europe united in the League of Nations, on the other. Finally this outstanding question of Mosul had been settled by friendly negotiations, but still Turkey maintained an attitude and by her treatment of foreign institutions established in Turkey seemed only to have transferred the struggle to another field. I had once again let it be understood that the Turkish Government that Turkey should not remain completely independent of foreigners for many of her essential services as she had previously been, and in order to understand the desire of the Government to encourage and promote Turkish enterprise and industry and finance. This was a natural reaction on the part of a patriotic Government, but as a party actually pursued patriotism seemed to have run to xenophobia, and though Turkey was at peace with us and her policy in itself need give us no great obstacle in the way of any really cordial relations.

You will observe that I took no account of Soviet Russia although it was present to the character of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Government when Signor Mussolini referred to Bolshevism. The Ambassador was almost equally guarded in his reply, but he clearly suspected that I had more in mind than I chose to express. He admitted to some extent the criticisms whilst offering the best excuses that he could for the conduct of his Government. He insisted, for instance, that the policy of Turkey was without *arrière pensée*, that the cost of which I complained in Eastern Thrace was a temporary expedient, but he added that Turkey was poor and weak, and that she could not forget that she had an extensive frontier to defend, that she must have some *point d'appui* and though I was sorry with Great Britain that she would not seek an alliance she would not commit herself to any step.

His Excellency had once more assured me that nothing of the sort had been contemplated, but as I had then told him it was difficult to reconcile such practices with that Great Britain should take up a passive attitude. We had got to the point at which public opinion would tolerate which we regarded the Treaty of Locarno and indeed British opinion had been educated to that treaty because of the greatness of the interest which it served, which was nothing less than the peace of the world. But though we could take no further engagements of a like nature as were members of the League of Nations and we had signed the Covenant. That was the protection with which we were [illegible] we could propose. I offered no advice to the Turkish Government, but I knew what I would do if I were there in their place. I should join the League, I should invoke the obligations of the Covenant and receive in return the protection which it gives. Referring to the subject of the treatment of foreigners, I observed that what the Ambassador had said of the desire of Turkey for good relations with other countries only strengthened my argument. The foreign [illegible] interfered with the good relations which it would seem was their desire to cultivate and was an obstacle which publicly declared to be by me. I could trust the Turkish Government would reconsider this matter and that they would see that it was to their interest, and indeed necessary to their material policy that they should faithfully execute the engagements they had undertaken. On the treaty of Lausanne and should cease to harry the foreigner with [illegible]. I had proceeded on many occasions had to consider myself or was asked to consider by others whether I should not raise or join in representations to the Turkish Government on the subject. I did not answer as I was possible, but I have been successful to Sir Rennell Lindsay more than once to call the attention of the Turkish Government to particular cases. I hoped that the Turkish Government would be [illegible] to adopting a more liberal and considerate policy in future.

Leaving this subject, his Excellency came to Italy. We had been asked that Italy had signed a treaty with Turkey, but as I had told [illegible] replied that Signor Mussolini had assured me that no treaty was to be signed. The treaty of amity and friendship with Signor Mussolini to be the object of any treaty other than [illegible] world but the treaty itself gave me no anxiety and the question would not, I felt sure, give rise to any difficulties between the British and Italian Governments.

Finally the Ambassador asked whether if the Italian Government did ever approach the British Government with a proposal directed against Turkey, the British Government would refuse to entertain it. I told his Excellency that this was a question which he ought not to have put to me and to which I could not reply for I assumed that Italy without provocation or legitimate grievance, would suddenly attack another State with which it was in peaceful relations. I could not answer a hypothetical question based upon such an assumption. His Excellency smiled broadly and declared that my reply satisfied him.

He added that in reporting what I had said to his Government he would separately comment on Turkish observations that part which related to the attitude of Signor Mussolini and the Italian Government, so that there should be no confusion between that which was said by me and that which was said by Signor Mussolini and that the representations which I had asked him to make might not be prejudiced by being presented with a totally different matter.

I have &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 26

Mr. Howe to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received October 17.)

No. 129
DESPATCH R. *Constantinople* October 15, 1926.

RECENT political articles have been regarding relations between Italy and Turkey. I also said a few words to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

E 5848/226/44 No. 27

Mr. Howe to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received October 18.)

No. 644.
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 13, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 581 of the 9th October on the subject of Italo-Turkish relations I have the honour to report that a sensational article in the Daily Express of the 12th instant has created a most painful impression in the Diplomatic Corps here. It purports to be based on information from a well-informed quarter and to emanate from Angora. The writer of the article goes on to say that Italian designs against Turkey have definitely reached the stage of actual preparation, and that the Italian Government has already begun to concentrate troops in Albania and Italian warships in the Adriatic. The article concludes with the statement that the Turkish Government is fully aware of the danger which threatens it, and is taking steps to meet it.

2. Whether or not there is any truth in the statements made in the Daily Express article, I am convinced that the publication of such an article at the present moment is calculated to do much harm to the cause of peace. Coming as it does on the heels of the recent Italo-Turkish crisis, it is bound to create a feeling of uneasiness and alarm throughout the Near East, and to give rise to rumours of impending hostilities between Italy and Turkey. Such rumours are already current in Constantinople, and I have reason to believe that they have been circulated in Pera by Turkish officials.

3. I have also received information from Angora that at the opening of the Assembly at the beginning of November an important speech is to be delivered on foreign affairs is expected. It is also expected that in his speech he will declare Turkey's friendship for Russia and Germany, and will denounce the League of Nations as a tool in the hands of the British Government. Should Ismet Pasha make such a speech, it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that he has been encouraged to do so by the knowledge that Turkey has the support of Italy behind her.

4. I am reporting these rumours, which are at present without foundation, because they may throw some light on the present tension in the relations between Turkey and Italy, and may help to explain the atmosphere of suspicion and uneasiness which the Turkish official classes have created in Constantinople. The prevalence of these suspicions gives a more serious character to the question of the confidence or lack of confidence in the new Turkey which has been so widely advertised.

5. Though it is true that the Turkish public is at present being treated to a display of excessive confidence in the strength of the Government's position, and in the unanimity of the nation behind it, I am convinced that this confidence is largely assumed, and that beneath the surface there is a deep-seated feeling of apprehension and alarm at the prospect of having to engage in another war. The Turkish people, as I have had occasion to point out in previous despatches, are heartily sick of war, and all that they ask is to be left in peace to develop the resources of their country. The Turkish Government is fully aware of this feeling, and knows that the people would look upon the outbreak of another war as a disaster rather than as a blessing. The Turkish officials, on the other hand, are anxious to avoid war, as they realise that they are not yet ready for it, and that the Turkish army is not in a condition to take the field. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government, as I have had occasion to point out in previous despatches, is deliberately fostering a spirit of bellicosity among the people, and is doing its best to create a war-like atmosphere. The object of this policy is obvious. It is intended to divert the attention of the people from the internal difficulties with which the Government is faced, and to distract their minds from the economic crisis through which the country is passing. It is also intended to serve as a means of intimidating the Kurds, and of preventing them from giving any further trouble. Finally, it is intended to serve as a means of intimidating the Greeks, and of preventing them from attempting to recover Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. The Turkish Government is also anxious to create a war-like atmosphere in order to justify the large expenditure on armaments which is being incurred, and which is causing such widespread discontent.

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE

E 5975/226/44 No. 28

Mr. Howe to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received October 25.)

No. 652
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1926.

AS we told you in connection with the sensational article in the Daily Express of the 9th instant regarding Italian warlike intentions against Turkey, which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 644 of the 13th instant, the Embassy has been inundated with enquiries as to the origin of the rumours that it was that source which had given rise to the article.

2. One of the first persons who came out in Constantinople were the Italian correspondents of the general staff of the Italian Army, who are in the neighbourhood of Angora, and the Embassy has received numerous enquiries from them.

3. You will have already seen the report I made to you by the 9th (No. 638) instant that the Italian Military Attaché had left Angora with a *firman* of a similar kind to that granted to the German delegation.

4. I gather from the German Ambassador, who has just returned from a visit to Angora, that the Daily Express statement was quite untrue. His Excellency tells me that he was kindly received by Ismet Pasha, who told him that he had no intention of breaking off relations with Italy. Sir Austen Chamberlain's telegram No. 317 of the 11th October (not to hand when I wrote my despatch of the 13th October) that I sent to you by bag, is not clear as to whether the Italian movement referred to in the Daily Express article is that which has just taken place, but it seems possible that it is, despite its alleged connection with the attacks on Ismet Pasha's person.

5. Cyprus, Istanbul, Smyrna and Athens have been consistent with the lines on which the Italian Government protested to Angora, while Russia, Bulgaria and Roumania have resisted the Turkish suggestion that the Greek Minister to Sofia had been murdered. Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania have all been content to adopt a non-committal attitude. The Soviet Ambassador, who has been over to Angora, has not yet returned to his post, but the Italian Chargé d'Affaires who recently proceeded for a holiday to Switzerland, has been summoned back to Angora, and is expected to arrive there on the 20th instant. The Italian Ambassador, who is at present in Rome, is also expected to return to his post in the course of the next few days.

6. My Italian colleague has also given me a detailed account of his recent interview with Ismet Pasha. He was struck by the change which has come over the Turkish Premier since he last saw him in Angora in May last. Ismet Pasha was then in a very nervous and excitable state, and was obviously labouring under the strain of the Mosul question. He is now calm and collected, and appears to be in full control of the situation. He told my colleague that he was convinced that Italy had no intention of attacking Turkey, and that the Italian Government had no desire to quarrel with Turkey. He added that he was not afraid of Italy, and that he was prepared to meet any Italian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Russia, and that he was prepared to meet any Russian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Germany, and that he was prepared to meet any German attack. He also said that he was not afraid of France, and that he was prepared to meet any French attack. He also said that he was not afraid of England, and that he was prepared to meet any English attack. He also said that he was not afraid of America, and that he was prepared to meet any American attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Japan, and that he was prepared to meet any Japanese attack. He also said that he was not afraid of China, and that he was prepared to meet any Chinese attack. He also said that he was not afraid of India, and that he was prepared to meet any Indian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Egypt, and that he was prepared to meet any Egyptian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Persia, and that he was prepared to meet any Persian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Afghanistan, and that he was prepared to meet any Afghan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Arabia, and that he was prepared to meet any Arabian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Abyssinia, and that he was prepared to meet any Abyssinian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Liberia, and that he was prepared to meet any Liberian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Haiti, and that he was prepared to meet any Haitian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Santo Domingo, and that he was prepared to meet any Santo Domingan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Cuba, and that he was prepared to meet any Cuban attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Mexico, and that he was prepared to meet any Mexican attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Guatemala, and that he was prepared to meet any Guatemalan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Honduras, and that he was prepared to meet any Honduran attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Nicaragua, and that he was prepared to meet any Nicaraguan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Costa Rica, and that he was prepared to meet any Costa Rican attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Panama, and that he was prepared to meet any Panamanian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Colombia, and that he was prepared to meet any Colombian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Venezuela, and that he was prepared to meet any Venezuelan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Ecuador, and that he was prepared to meet any Ecuadorian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Peru, and that he was prepared to meet any Peruvian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Bolivia, and that he was prepared to meet any Bolivian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Chile, and that he was prepared to meet any Chilean attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Argentina, and that he was prepared to meet any Argentinian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Brazil, and that he was prepared to meet any Brazilian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Uruguay, and that he was prepared to meet any Uruguayan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Paraguay, and that he was prepared to meet any Paraguayan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of the United States, and that he was prepared to meet any American attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Canada, and that he was prepared to meet any Canadian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Mexico, and that he was prepared to meet any Mexican attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Guatemala, and that he was prepared to meet any Guatemalan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Honduras, and that he was prepared to meet any Honduran attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Nicaragua, and that he was prepared to meet any Nicaraguan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Costa Rica, and that he was prepared to meet any Costa Rican attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Panama, and that he was prepared to meet any Panamanian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Colombia, and that he was prepared to meet any Colombian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Venezuela, and that he was prepared to meet any Venezuelan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Ecuador, and that he was prepared to meet any Ecuadorian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Peru, and that he was prepared to meet any Peruvian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Bolivia, and that he was prepared to meet any Bolivian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Chile, and that he was prepared to meet any Chilean attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Argentina, and that he was prepared to meet any Argentinian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Brazil, and that he was prepared to meet any Brazilian attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Uruguay, and that he was prepared to meet any Uruguayan attack. He also said that he was not afraid of Paraguay, and that he was prepared to meet any Paraguayan attack.

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE

Enclosure in No 28

Extract from the Journal Officiel of October 17 1926

DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS AND POLITICAL NEWS

THE article in the Petit Parisien concerning the Franco-Turkish commercial treaty and the attitude of the Daily Express, which we published yesterday, has given rise to numerous comments in the Paris press. M. Mussolini's article in the Daily Express, in which he declared that Italy would not be the first to denounce the Treaty of Lausanne, has also been commented upon.

In French parliamentary circles these questions are considered of secondary importance. The Daily Express article is regarded as a manœuvre on the part of the Italian Government to create difficulties for the Left Parties in the Chamber.

The Government is not expected to make any statement on the matter, and it is considered that the best reply to the Daily Express article will be given by the Ambassadors at the meeting of the Council of Ambassadors on October 20th.

The Council will then have to consider the question of the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission from Germany, and the Ambassadors will be asked to give their opinion as to whether Germany has carried out sufficiently the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

E 6004 708 44 No 29

Sir W. Erskine to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received October 9)

(No. 458) *Sofia, October 20, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 448 of the 30th June, I have the honour to report that, in response to enquiries, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have informed me that the ratification of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship and its annexes and the protocol of the 2nd August were exchanged at Angora on the 2nd August M. Ciraky Dosoff representing the Bulgarian Government.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

E 6196 59 44 No 30

Mr. Hurst to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 8)

(No. 286) *Constantinople, November 3, 1926*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the 8th session of the Grand National Assembly was opened by the President of the Republic on the 1st instant.

2. In his speech which was punctuated by applause, especially when he referred to the plan against the life of Mustafa Kemal, Gazi Pasha reviewed the events of the past year with its crop of hostile attempts and conspiracies. He then gave an account of the activities of the Government and of the Assembly.

3. He recorded great progress in every branch of the national activity. The country was now at peace with all its neighbours, and the relations with Greece, Persia, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia were more friendly than ever. The Treaty of Friendship with Italy had been signed, and the Italian Government had withdrawn their troops from Anatolia.

It was evident that they were in accord with the real needs and aspirations of the nation.

4. As regards economic questions, it was particularly gratifying to record that coasting was now reserved to Turkish flags. Commissions had been sitting to examine the possibility of developing the production of coal and iron. Their reports were encouraging, and legislation would be introduced to ensure an increased production. Other laws would be enacted to increase manufactures in general.

5. Agriculture was the cornerstone of the national prosperity, and the Ministry of Agriculture was doing all that was possible for its welfare.

6. As regards means of communication, various constructive reforms were intended to accelerate the progress of roads. The railways were progressing, and it was satisfactory to record that the Smyrna-Cassaba line had been completed. But more rapid progress was necessary, and when the Budget was being prepared efforts would be made to assign larger credits to the railways in order to assist the assistance of private enterprise.

7. A new law on primary education had been drafted by the present session. A reasonable sum of money had been voted for the construction of new schools.

8. The new Budget [illegible] ordinary revenue [illegible] the ordinary expenditure [illegible] the Budget [illegible] the Assembly [illegible] the Budget [illegible] the Budget [illegible] the Budget

"Our relations with Mr must be continued as marked by the mutual security known to you

"To forma the connection with the demarcation of the frontiers between us Iraq to Syria are about to commence

"Our relations with these countries have been conducted in a spirit of mutual desire to secure security and good neighborly relations. I am hopeful that these ans will be accompanied with the security that characterises the preparation of the documents thereon. It is by no means the case of all of our relations happy upon the countries with whom and Great Britain

"Our relations with Mr principal foreign policy are Our relations throughout with a view of maintaining friendly. This line of conduct is held by the state of the world

"The Government of the United States with regards to the recent Conference of Nov proceedings and I hope that things to bring some benefit to all. I regret to say the results of the negotiations were not

"I am glad to say that the relations between our two countries are very cordial. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Persia

"We have had a visit from Mr Minister of Foreign Affairs who has been with us for some days. He has had interviews with the Secretary of State and with the President. We have had many discussions on matters of mutual interest to the United States and Persia, and I am glad to say that I am able to inform you that the relations between the two countries are most friendly and cordial. Mr has left for Washington, where he will be received by the President and Secretary of State. I am sure that his visit will be productive of much good to both countries.

"We have had a visit from Mr Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has been staying with us for some days. He has had interviews with the President and Secretary of State, and I am glad to say that the relations between the United States and Persia are most friendly. Mr has left for Washington, where he will be received by the President and Secretary of State. I am sure that his visit will be productive of much good to both countries.

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Kabul, stating that he has handed to the Afghan Government a note in which His Majesty's Government express their deep sympathy with the Afghan Government and people in the recent earthquake disaster, and offer any assistance which may be required. The Afghan Government have replied in grateful terms, and have intimated that they do not require any assistance at present, but will not hesitate to apply for it should circumstances render it necessary

established will contribute to increase the prosperity and welfare of their respective nations,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and for that purpose have named their plenipotentiaries as follows

The President of the Argentine Republic

His Excellency Dr. Fernando Perez, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic before His Majesty the King of Italy

The President of the Turkish Republic

His Excellency Said Bey, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Turkish Republic before His Majesty the King of Italy,

Who, after having communicated their full powers, found in good and proper form, have agreed to the following

ARTICLE 1

There shall be unalterable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship between the Argentine Republic and the Turkish Republic as well as between the citizens of both parties

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations between the two States in conformity with the principles of the right of peoples They agree that the diplomatic and consular representatives of each of the parties shall receive on the basis of reciprocity in the territory of the other, the treatment consecrated by the general principles of international law

ARTICLE [illegible]

The present treaty will be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in Rome with the least possible delay It will come into force on the fifteenth day after the exchange of ratifications.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed their seals.

Done in Rome on the 29th June, 1926, in two copies, one of each of which shall be remitted to each of the signatory States.

(L.S.) FERNANDO PEREZ. (L.S.) SAID BEY

No. 33.

Sir R. Hodgson to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 11)

(No. 250)
(Telegraphic) R *Moscow, November 11, 1926*

M. CHICHERIN left Moscow on 9th November for Odessa, where he will meet Rushdi Bey who is due by "Hamidieh" 12th November. Turkish Ambassador accompanied him. Pretext is to return visit of Soviet torpedo boat to Turkish ports.

No. 34

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 11)*

(No. 134)
Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, November 11, 1926*

OFFICIAL communique states that Minister for Foreign Affairs left last night in cruiser "Hamidieh" for Odessa, at the invitation of M. Chicherin. This visit is consecration of personal friendship which unites the two Ministers and of most cordial relations between the two countries."

Minister for Foreign Affairs arrived here quite unexpectedly yesterday. He declared to reporters that he would stay a few days and then return to Angora.

According to press he is accompanied by Taimurtash, three officials of Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Turkish Ambassador at Teheran, and that the object of the journey is signature of Turco-Russo-Persian Treaty of Security.

Intended journey had been kept profound secret.

Taimurtash told me two days ago that he was returning to Tehran viâ Berlin.

I will telegraph if I can obtain further details.

(Repeated to Tehran No. 6.)

No. 35

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 12)

(No. 135)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, November 11, 1926*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Taimurtash did not accompany the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am inclined to believe that statement was published by "Republique" to encourage the "Temps" correspondent to be here at the time of Aristide Pact.

I secured final visa of Minister for Foreign Affairs's passage but I did not wish to display curiosity but possibly he might be able to tell me something about the purpose of this sudden journey. He replied that M. Chicherin had expressed the desire to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs before he himself went to Berlin and Paris. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would leave Ineboli at Odessa and be back here on Monday.

I cannot explain the mystification indulged in by the Minister for Foreign Affairs unless it is simply due to the desire to set people talking. The impending interview is believed to be regarded as rejoinder to the Leghorn conversation.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

E 6319/59/44 No. 36.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 15)

(No. 595)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 9, 1926*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Stamboul giving the speech* delivered in the Angora Assembly by Ismet Pasha on the 6th instant.

2. Dealing first with home affairs, the Pasha defined his policy as consisting, firstly, of various reforms and, secondly, of measures to preserve the unity of the nation, a euphemism for repression. The reforms undertaken—no doubt, he had hats particularly in mind—had, he said, been carried through successfully. Of the Kurdish rebellion, he would only say that Eastern Anatolia was now in much the same state as Western Anatolia was in 1923 when he first became Prime Minister. This does not amount to more than admitting that the administration of Eastern Anatolia is disorganised. To those who disagreed with the Government he threw out the advice that they should use the constitutional remedy offered by the next elections—a somewhat cynical suggestion in view of the drastic manner in which the official opposition party and all elements of potential opposition have been destroyed.

3. On foreign policy Ismet Pasha once more affirmed what I believe is the truth—that the Government's resolve was to maintain the security of Turkey and all changes and chances but to be at enmity with no one, to be friendly with Turkey's friends, to reciprocate whatever treatment Turkey might receive, whether good or bad, and to take great care to commit no injustice. Whether this last phrase is intended to hold out a promise of a fairer interpretation of foreign rights under the Lausanne settlement I cannot say. But the remark that Turkey means to set herself up against no one else has been produced several times in the press lately to meet the suggestion that Tunur Tash Khan or Mr. Alfred Sze (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 588 of the 3rd instant) was endeavouring to draw Turkey into an Asiatic combine directed by Moscow against Western Europe. Nusret Bey, to whom

* Not printed

I mentioned a cartoon on this subject, assured me that the Turkish Government had no idea of joining any such combination. Both these gentlemen have now returned from Angora. Mr. Sze I gather, was only received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and I do not see any reason to doubt the statement he has made to American friends at Robert College here that he was enquiring into the circumstances in which Capitulations disappeared in Turkey.

4. Timur Tash Khan had an unusually ceremonious reception: detachments of troops, immediate interview with the Ghazi and banquets. He is also reported by the press to have conferred at length with the Soviet and Afghan representatives. Nothing definite has transpired about the object of Timur Tash Khan's visit and I can add nothing to the view expressed in my despatch No. 588.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

No. 37

Sir R. Hoare (Angora) to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received November 15.*)

(No. 252.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 15, 1926.*

My Telegram No. 240.

Speeches exchanged at Odessa contain nothing but repetition of *ad nauseam* of all commonplaces and absurd protestations of unalterable friendship as a pledge of world peace and mutual engagements. My information is to the effect that the meeting has no significance except as a threatening gesture intended to impress the West with a sense of the solidarity of the ties which bind Russia to Turkey, of all the wheels that are associated with aggressive designs upon the former and Italy the latter, when Turkey is both said to be a victim of intrigue on the question of the Straits.

This impression is supported by a statement made by M. Litvinov to Italian representative which I have from the latter's own lips. He asked Litvinov for the explanation of the Government's attitude towards Mussolini's offer. M. Litvinov replied that it meant nothing but an exchange of courtesies and suffered at the press version which associated it with the local conception of an Asiatic Pact.

No. 38

Sir R. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received November 17.*)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 16, 1926.*

Mr. HOARE's telegram No. 145.

Minister for Foreign Affairs returned this morning and went straight on to Angora.

Press reproduces communiqué issued at Odessa to the effect that the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs having reviewed the questions interesting the two countries were agreed that no existing question was of a nature to modify existing political ties of either Government and thereby to prejudice their good relations the strengthening of which is of capital importance to the peace of the world.

(Repeated to Tehran No. 9.)

W 10841 10584 28 No. 39

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

No. 1022.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 19, 1926.*

THE Italian Ambassador repeated to me to-day the assurance given to your Excellency by Signor Mussolini that the Italian Government would not at this moment raise the question of an Italian Post Office at Tangier whilst reserving their right to do so on a future occasion. I was under the impression that the Italian Government based their claim upon the Statute, and I observed that they could not found a claim upon a document to which they had not adhered. The Ambassador replied that they derived their rights from the Capitulations. We agreed that it was unnecessary for us to discuss the question now, but I reserved my right to form a judgment on the claim if ever it was raised.

From this subject the Ambassador passed to the communication which you had made to Signor Mussolini on the subject of military control in Germany, and I developed to him more fully the reasons for which His Majesty's Government desired to terminate the inter-Allied control and to pass the matter over to the League of Nations.

Finally the Ambassador asked about Turco-Soviet relations, and I gave him a bowdlerised account of my conversation with the Turkish Ambassador emphasising however the suspicions which the Turkish Government entertained of Italian policy and laying stress upon the fact that the Turkish tendency to turn to the Soviet arose from their fear of Italy.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

E 6436 59 44 No. 40

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received November 22.*)

(No. 402. Secret.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 15, 1926.*

FROM a first-hand source, which I consider reliable, I have received information about the plans of some of the Opposition leaders. I gather that Djaud Bey, at present in Paris, is in touch with Kiazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad and Refet the three Pashas whom the Independence Friend at Smyrna has reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 375 of the 21st July 1926, did not directly connect or complicity in the attempt to assassinate the Ghazi. He has found means of corresponding with his political associates and is actively working to secure the overthrow of the Ghazi. In his present mood he is quite irreconcilable and I have little doubt that the other leaders of the Opposition, who are still in this country, share his temper.

2. According to my informant, Djaud Bey does not contemplate anything in the nature of civil war. He regards Turkey as quite unripe for anything which demands a certain amount of political understanding, and the kind of change which he contemplates is a *coup d'état* swiftly and neatly executed at Chan Kaya the residence of the Ghazi outside Angora. To quote his own words, what he is working for is the 'changing of the guard' at Chan Kaya, which in Turkey simply means the laying of the guard. No doubt the Ghazi is alive to the danger for the Ghazi knows as well as his enemies that political power in this country depends entirely upon the army and more especially upon the Prætorian Guard. Once the latter could make this Imperial President prisoner, his prestige might disappear as rapidly as that of many a Roman Emperor whose power rested on the swords immediately surrounding him.

3. I doubt very much if the Opposition have any definite plans as yet regarding the moment for action. Simple as the method may be, the offence is equally simple, and the Ghazi can be relied upon to be extremely watchful. In spite of his debaucheries he still keeps a clear head, and it may be some time before the other side gets a good opening for attack. It is idle to forecast the chances of success and failure where everything may depend on the whims of a handful of people, and where broad political issues play so small a part. The interesting fact, however, is that the Opposition are not asleep, and that they are actively working to bring about a change by the only means understood in Oriental countries.

4. The Angora trial (see my despatches Nos. 455 and 458) has in fact, failed to accomplish its purpose. Constitutional opposition may be dead, but active opposition is at work underground.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 6437/59/44] No 41

Mr Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received November 22)

(No. 605)

Sir, *Constantinople November 14, 1926*

WITH reference to my despatch No 531 of the 6th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report drawn up by Mr Leeper on a fortnight's tour which he recently made to Mersina Smyrna and Rhodes with Mr Helm and Mr Buchan Hepburn.

2 Before starting on their journey they had been at some pains to work out the principal points on which they would endeavour to obtain information with the result that the report will be found to contain information with the result that the report will be found to contain information with the result that the report will be found to cont

me that nothing was being done in the way of improvements and that discontent was general on the part of all classes. The Valis both at Adana and Mersina are closely controlled by the agents of the People's party, and it is considered a sufficient merit in a Vali not to be active in Arab affairs. Such is the standard of administration, and with this system of espionage and party dictatorship the Ghazi hopes to modernise Turkey. The methods remind one of Russia at every turn. The party tyranny, the secret police, the Cheka, and even the League of Communist Youth (compare the Turkish Ojak, though a more respectable institution perhaps) have their parallels in Turkey.

7. Set beside the apathy and inefficiency of the Turkish administration is the remarkable activity of the Italians in Cilicia. Mr. Crolla, His Majesty's consul at Mersina, has from time to time reported on the activities of the Italians. But even to one who is already prepared to see Italian activity is arresting. The Italian consul-general, M. Mochi, is the most active representative of Fascism, and if the latter take the prize from Dr. Crolla, it is a close-run thing. One can only guess at the real intentions of the Italian Government, but I do not think that I am misjudging M. Mochi in saying that he looks upon his work as of real importance for the future. He has 600 emigrants in Cilicia and is to have left the pioneer in the eventual despoliation of the province by Italy. At the same time there is nothing sensational in all this activity. The Italians are obviously prepared to be there a long time, make themselves agreeable to the local population by what appears their present role of being interested and helpful, and to cultivate the friendship of Ankara. About a year ago a society named Società Italiana di Commercio di Mersina (Cassis) was formed at Mersina with a branch at Alexandretta. Its interests are at present confined to Cilicia, and it is already looked upon as the main business organization. Its paper capital will be doubled. In short, universal activity and the occupation of the European has particularly struck by the enthusiasm of the Italians, whose apparently inexhaustible energy is far-reaching. Politics is certainly a part of this programme, and Dr. Crolla drew my attention to a speech that the Italian engineer, who was to be in charge of the railway to Konia, had made to the Italian colony at Mersina. He was to be there only a few months, but he was going to "impress both foreigners and Turks with the fact that Italy is not dead." This was all in order to create a good impression at Rhodes, but the atmosphere was already there at Mersina. It is obvious from the speech that the Italians are able to be very tactful when they like.

8. I must now say that Mochi is one of the most expert men to understand the innermost soul of a foreigner and any attempt to judge the lines upon which he is working must be largely guesswork. However, being a strongly good Italian, he enjoys criticising the French, and thinking this might be useful, I encouraged him to develop his theme. His argument was that the French had not gone far enough in their occupation of Cilicia. They should be at the head of the pass and not Bozanti, near the Cilician Gates, should have been their frontier. If another Power be invited with enthusiasm were forced to resign this control over the future the failure of the French should be a good object lesson. A further point on which he insisted was that Cilicia and North Syria, including Alexandretta, Meskeneh, Antioch should form one unit, that the economic conditions were similar, and that the political conditions should follow suit. Taking this in conjunction with the work of the Sicmat it seemed to me significant, though the evidence was insufficient to go further.

9. Cilicia is a tempting province, tempting both for its fertility and for its good natural frontiers. The Taurus shuts it off completely from the plateau and the one gap in the mountains could be held without great difficulty. To the south of the Taurus the fertile Cilician plain extends from some 20 miles west of Mersina to the borders of Syria. West of Mersina the plain is uncultivated and almost uninhabited, to the east there is a large population but that too could be increased enormously, even supposing that the figure of 2 million is a correct estimate of the population. One cannot feel that in these days of keen competition so rich a territory can be left in its present condition. What is difficult to explain is the neglect of the Turks. If they continue as they are they are simply asking for trouble.

Adalia

10. Between Cilicia and Adalia the coast is forbidding. The mountains come down to the water's edge and there is nothing to tempt the foreigner. At Adalia the mountains draw apart sufficiently for the sake of a wide and fertile plain. Adalia has always been looked upon as the part most coveted by Italy and it underwent an Italian occupation for four years. Why this should have been

so it is difficult to understand. There are no immediate prospects for development there. Adalia is not compact and easily defended like Cilicia. Its prosperity depends mainly on the hinterland and on the construction of a railway connecting it with Konia. It would appear that the Italians now recognise this and that they have transferred the greater part of their energies to Cilicia. At Adalia they have a consular agent who has been there since the days of the occupation. He told me that the number of Italian subjects was no more than twenty and that no further development was in prospect. The town was decaying, large capital which could only be found abroad was required for any enterprise. His main object so far as I could judge was to keep the Italian flag flying. His policy was one of defence rather than offence. For example, the Italians took it worth while keeping open their school with four pupils in the face of Turkish opposition to supplement the number they are prepared to import pupils from Smyrna. This can only be explained on the theory that there must be no retreat from an already established position until it is clear what the future has in store.

Rhodes

11. Rhodes is clearly visible from the Anatolian mainland. From Cape Crio to Makri to Rhodes it is only four hours by steamer, but it is one of those coasts where one has passed from Asia into Europe from colour and clarity into dust, haze and almost feverish activity. In Adalia and along the coast one sees houses neglected or dilapidated, in Rhodes they are springing up in every direction. A good road, or a street is hard to find, and when found will suddenly give way to a rough track or disappear round some corner, leaving the traveller to find his own way. Rhodes and Scarpanto already have at their disposal networks of first-class roads. This is a good thing for the future, and is partly intended for that, but the expense must also be considered. I have no doubt that the point of the Italians is that he should spread the story of their achievements far and wide, so that the transference of Rhodes to Anatolia will be better able to tell the story itself. Foreigners in Rhodes are already impressed, and the Rhodes correspondent of the Levant Herald is himself obviously impressed by the magnificence of what is being done. Roads, however, are still not the only thing necessary for this experiment. There must be a railway in the future, and the Italian authorities seem to be considering it. The Turks in Rhodes are treated justly and even generously. Far more so than in their own country. A few less away, and even the Turkish consul admits that they are not returning to Turkey. In Rhodes they still wear the fez and baggy trousers. They are not hustled into ways which are strange to them and need not feel that their womenfolk are being led astray by strange doctrines and given rights which upset the tranquillity of their homes. The Turks cannot stop all traffic between the island and the mainland. Caiques ply frequently from shore to shore and no doubt they carry stories to the mainland which would not be welcome to Angora. This is wise propaganda and the Italians are clearly interested in it. They are also clearly interested in impressing the foreigner with their capacity for good administration in the Levant. For when after visiting Rhodes one has to ask himself whether this work of civilisation could not also be followed up on the other side of the water? Whenever maybe a Turk is drawing up nice clean sheets on a clean bed in a hotel at Rhodes, can fail to say to himself before falling into an undisturbed sleep: How pleasant this would be in Anatolia! And that is no doubt what the Italians desire.

12. The Governor of Rhodes, M. Lago, is a diplomat, and the affairs of the Dodecanese come under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Rome. This is not surprising. Rhodes as a colony will never be expected to bring Italy much return. Italian colonists are to be brought to Rhodes, Leros and one or two other of the most barren islands. But even supposing that they succeed in planting 4,000 Italian peasants on the land, this provides no solution for emigration nor does it justify the attention that the islands are receiving. I was told that Italian officers openly boast that one day they will occupy the coast of Anatolia. This, perhaps, is merely the exuberance of the Italian officers and may be quite outside the plans of M. Mussolini. Local opinion however is inclined to take them at their word, and it would be difficult to stay long in this atmosphere without sharing the suspicions of the inhabitants.

13. The only other island we visited was Leros, ten hours by steamer from Rhodes, and also within sight of the Anatolian coast. In Porto Lago it contains the best harbour in the Dodecanese and the Italians have chosen it as a hydroplane base. They are also busily fortifying the hills which surround it. As we steamed out of the harbour the Turkish consul in Rhodes, a former colonel, was assistant in

a former captain), who happened to be a fellow passenger, joined me on the deck, and showed himself obviously anxious to talk. The first day on board he had been very discreet, but the day in Leros had helped to loosen his tongue. As we leant over the side he pointed to various places on the mountain side which he told me that, as an expert in these matters, he knew concealed cannon. He could not or would not hide his bitterness, and when I asked him why he thought all these preparations were being made he merely shrugged his shoulders. I have little doubt that he was making the voyage for this particular purpose, and I have little doubt also that he thought it useful to call my attention to these matters for at a later period he as much as said that Turkey would need British assistance.

Smyrna

14. At Smyrna one is transported into a different atmosphere. Here we are out of reach of Italian guns and the Italian obsession is much less apparent. It is at the back of people's minds but the place of honour is reserved for more pressing woes. As the first export centre of Turkey Smyrna realises to the full the shortcomings of the present Administration and longs for a change. The foreign element is full of complaints that Turks, too, who are interested in commerce are discontented. I would not say that the professional classes, the Turkish *intelligentsia* as such as it is, are not sick of the present state of things. They still rather like the idea that Turkey is a Turkish land and that the foreigner is no longer top dog in it, even though he deals with us primarily. In how far, however, who acts as the mediator between the peasant and the foreign exporter is profoundly dissatisfied. The Turkish peasant is a good producer but with the present system of red tape his produce has ceased to have a market. As soon as the price reaches the quay the middleman begins to raise his profits. This is still a far cry to wrecking the foreign trade. He would have to travel still further on the downward path before that could be regarded as the way of salvation. Still it is not safe for the Government to betray a first symptom.

CONCLUSIONS

15. Certain points to impress themselves from the visit and for the sake of clearness I would sum them up as follows:

Italian Policy

16. (*a*) There was no evidence that the Italians were meditating any act of violence against Turkey. Rumours to this effect which emanate from Turkey are either due to nerves or else are calculated exaggeration in order to keep the Turks up to the mark. There is only one regiment of infantry at Rhodes and the Turkish consul there admitted that no special preparations were being made. The hydroplane base at Leros is more serious, but this too is, on a normal development.

(*b*) Italian aims seem to be directed purely towards economic penetration especially of Cilicia. Their activities there are quite legitimate and they are doing nothing to cause offence. On the contrary their presence seems to be rather welcomed by the local population.

(*c*) The activity at Rhodes probably has two ends in view: (*a*) Propaganda to impress both the Turks and foreigners generally; (*b*) the establishment of a strong outpost in case of insurrection in Turkey of which the Italians might feel forced to take advantage.

Turkish Policy

17. The Turks are obviously frightened of the Italians but so far have shown little sign of wisdom in meeting the danger. They are paying attention to the defence of their coast but are paying little attention to the removal of grievances in the vulnerable parts. On the contrary they show apathy and neglect, usual characteristics of the Turks in all matters not connected with war. Things are getting worse rather than better. The administrative machine for this is badly and discontent is becoming more general. The policy of Turkey for the Turks, with which the Ghazi is associated, is already provoking a reaction and is now operating many classes of Turks as well as all classes of foreigners.

Future Possibilities

18. The contrast between Italian efficiency and Turkish inefficiency is the most striking feature in Southern Anatolia and the Dodecanese. Turkish nationalism in its present crude form can only justify itself by success. To browbeat the foreigner and to fail oneself is only courting disaster. How can Turkey pull herself out of the rut into which she has fallen and safeguard herself against foreign intervention? Is the present regime capable of doing it? Would the Opposition prove itself more capable?

19. While in Smyrna I learnt from a very reliable source something of the plans of the Opposition. These are being reported separately in despatch No. 602 of the 15th November. Whether they succeed or not it is clear that the Opposition mean to try to oust the Ghazi.

20. There are thus two possibilities for Turkey if she is to continue to exist as an independent nation without foreign intervention:

1. The Ghazi himself may change his attitude towards the foreigner, drop a good deal of the blind nationalism which he has taught and got the foreigner to help and to teach his own helpless and ignorant compatriots.
2. The Opposition may oust the Ghazi, bring the capital back to Constantinople, open the country to foreigners, and by giving different Powers a stake in Turkey secure her political independence for an indefinite period.

21. This policy ought to reduce if not remove altogether all danger of Italian aggression. For the peace of Europe it would be the best course and if Italy were given a fair field for economic enterprise it ought to satisfy her. In any case it is clear that Turkey could develop the immense possibilities of Anatolia unaided. If she is content to sell how her resources lie and, as far as in the proper sphere she ought to secure, to trust against interference, if not the whole structure of Turkey may again be in the melting pot some years hence with all the international complications which it would involve.

No. 42

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received November 25.*)

(Unpublished.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 24, 1926.*

EVERYTHING connected with presentation of credentials has passed off satisfactorily. As I am told that Turkish cordiality on this occasion has been very marked. They have certainly been surprisingly helpful and energetic in drawing up arrangements for journey and in hastening through reception and official dinner without any waste of time.

Visit of High Commissioner of Bagdad was undoubtedly much appreciated and President of the Republic kept him talking for two hours, an unprecedented event.

Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and President laid much stress on their desire for friendship with Great Britain. Minister for Foreign Affairs explained Odessa visit as one of courteous reaffirmation of friendship and general survey of Russian points of interest but emphatically not aimed at other Powers nor creation of new agreements. General view here seems to be that purpose was to show the West especially Italy that Turkey has its friends too, and Turks possibly there was also desire to hearten Turkish public opinion and to explain to Russia Turkish policy in regard to League of Nations.

[E 8564/226/44] No. 43.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople).

(No. 660.) *Foreign Office, November 26, 1926.*

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador called this morning to bid me farewell before proceeding on leave to Angora.

His Excellency suggested that there might perhaps be some matters which I should wish him to bring specially to the notice of his Government. I accordingly recalled our last conversation and the reference I had then made to the treatment of foreign institutions in Foreign commercial houses in Turkey. I said that I would not enter into details of any particular case with the Ambassador as your Excellency was fully instructed upon the subject and I had asked you when a suitable

opportunity offered of bringing them to the attention of the Turkish Government but I should be glad if the Ambassador would himself draw the attention of the Turkish Government to the various steps which were initiated for British institutions and trade during last spring with a view to their revival and without the knowledge of the President of the Republic and the Government but which nevertheless created a disagreeable impression and were an obstacle to the cordial relations which His Majesty's Government desired to see established between our two countries. If this explanation were not good enough to draw the special attention of the President of the Council the Foreign Office Representative thereby observed they would not be able to explain a great deal of the kind of assistance which was being given to the Turkish Government in connection with the desire to obtain the services of British officials and subjects. The Representative of the Foreign Office also pointed out that the policy of harassing foreign interests and of boycotting British goods which had been attributed to Enver Pasha and his associates was directed against Turkey as much as the foreign interests themselves.

The Ambassador then proceeded to make certain observations which were to the effect that he decided to abstain from speaking. He then went on to say that he would like to point out that the Government could be in no doubt as to the attitude which they should adopt in the present circumstances. There were two possible lines of action. The first was to remain in Paris and to continue to take part in the deliberations of the Supreme Council. The second was to withdraw from the Conference. His Excellency pointed out that the first course would be open to the objection that it would be difficult for him to remain in Paris and to take part in the deliberations of the Supreme Council when the Turkish Government had declared war on the Allied Powers. He would be unable to give effect to any decisions arrived at by the Supreme Council which were contrary to the interests of Turkey. He would therefore be obliged to withdraw from the Conference and to return to Constantinople. Having done so he would be in a position to inform the Government of what had taken place at the Conference and to explain the position in which they would be placed if they decided to accept the Peace Terms which were being drawn up by the Supreme Council. He would also be able to explain the attitude of the Government with regard to the League of Nations. He would point out that the Government had always been opposed to the participation of Turkey in the League of Nations and that they had only consented to the insertion of the Covenant in the Treaty of Sèvres because they had been given to understand that the Covenant would be a dead letter and that no serious attempt would be made to put it into force. He would point out that the Government had also consented to the insertion of the Covenant in the Treaty of Sèvres because they had been given to understand that the Covenant would be a dead letter and that no serious attempt would be made to put it into force. He would point out that the Government had also consented to the insertion of the Covenant in the Treaty of Sèvres because they had been given to understand that the Covenant would be a dead letter and that no serious attempt would be made to put it into force.

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the one answer from whatever quarter it came. We desired to cultivate cordial relations with Turkey. I would not conceal from him that our relations with Italy were excellent and that we desired to keep them so. But whether it were Turkey or Italy or France (and we have stood by reason of our alliance having been at war and of our engagements in the Treaty of London) the closest relations of all, I should always refuse and I believed every British Government would refuse to give a resistance in advance as to the attitude which their representative on the Council would assume on matters any particular case when as some future time might come about that body. No doubt the Council exercised a great power, but in all cases as at present constituted they acted by the unanimous spirit. The decision must be taken upon the facts of the particular case by His Majesty's Government and I have no hesitation in saying that the decision would be taken regardless of the consequences to the relations between us and Turkey. But we should desire to avoid such an obligation if possible. This is why I pointed out to him that we were prepared to extend the assurances which we had given in respect of the Ottoman Empire to Turkey herself if she would agree to the terms which we were prepared to offer her. I added that these terms would be very favourable for instance we would not insist upon the interests of Austria who has always been in the habit of conveying to Turkey all her imported goods and [illegible] which would be to the great advantage of Turkey. I concluded by saying that I could not conceal from him that the refusal of Turkey to accept these terms would have a most unfavourable effect upon the general peace of the world.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 6557 226 44

No. 44

Sir R. Hodgson to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received November 4)

(No. 836)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 20, 1919.

With reference to my telegram No. 2 of the 19th instant I have the honour to report that Mr. Chichagoff returned to Moscow on the 17th instant from Odessa. His 'Hamidieh' will be with Rustchuk Bay for coal, but sailed for the evening of the 18th for Constantinople. Mr. Chichagoff also reached Moscow from Odessa on the 17th by earlier train than the Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

2. As might be expected the meeting caused a considerable stir in the foreign colonies in Moscow. It has been kept a great secret, as far as I have been concerned, I did not have the slightest knowledge that I would find on the pass for the 18th that Mr. Chichagoff left for Odessa. On the 18th Lieutenant Admiral Altvater would, I thought, be at Moscow was also mysterious. In reply to my enquiries as to the significance of the attraction of the event, Count Mirbach alone [illegible] the recent gathering of exiled politicians at Yalta and said, judging from such reports as were available, he thought it possible that a joint declaration by Soviet Russia, Outer Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey was to be published. In his view the substance of the declaration would be in the nature of a professed friendship and amity with a mutual pledge of non-aggression and of support in case of attack from outside. He pressed that elsewhere I did not support this previsions they have formed the conclusion that the Yalta rendezvous was concluded for purposes of European security. It was a case of [illegible] and I agree to my [illegible] in part, but with a sense of the reality of Three Soviet Republics.

3. Subsequent events tend to confirm the correctness of this view. Count Mirbach, who spoke, M. Litvinov had communication to which given. Privately, Government on the subject of the meeting was [illegible] that it was nothing more than an exchange of courtesies. The suggestion of a Pan-Asiatic league was received with gentle merriment. As I left the room M. Litvinov spoke to me [illegible] that M. Chicherin and Rustchuk Bay [illegible] together. Odessa on the pretext of [illegible] to [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Angora [illegible] Asiatic [illegible].

[1546]

4. On the other hand I have no doubt that both of the actors in the little comedy were delighted at the stir which their escapade created, that they had shrewdly counted [illegible] upon the fears and the hopes of Europe by the ears and the hopes of chasing [illegible] and that the comments of the Soviet press are exactly [illegible] Russian [illegible] from Izvestiya, which I enclose, [illegible] conveys their general tenor. It depicts Sir [illegible] as [illegible] "Harwich" and straining to catch scraps of the conversation between the two statesmen on board.

5. And what were the results? The press and the reports of the speeches delivered give a clue to both. The general justification assumption that dominated all the [illegible] was the general theme as he [illegible] [illegible] with certainty that the object [illegible] was to be achieved at [illegible] great

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

(Traduction.) *Speech by Turkish President of the Republic.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

C'EST avec un grand plaisir que je reçois des mains de votre Excellence, en même temps que les lettres de rappel de son éminent prédécesseur, les lettres par lesquelles Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne l'accrédite auprès de moi en qualité d'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire.

Je suis heureux de constater que les progrès realisés par la nation turque dans son effort décidé, pour couvrir les étapes de la vie moderne, aient été l'objet d'un intérêt tout particulier de la part de votre Excellence, et qu'elle pense justement que le résultat de cet effort ne fera que contribuer au progrès sain et pacifique du monde—seul but que nous cherchons, d'ailleurs, à atteindre.

Les assurances que votre Excellence veut bien formuler, qu'elle cherche à cultiver les meilleures relations entre nos deux pays et entre nos deux Gouvernements, surtout dans une période rendue si propice par la conclusion du traité qui a réglé d'une façon définitive les frontières entre la République turque et l'État de l'Irak, sont entièrement conformes à nos sentiments.

Votre Excellence peut être persuadée qu'elle peut toujours compter sur mon appui personnel, ainsi que sur le concours du Gouvernement de la République, dans ses efforts tendant au développement et au ressorrement des relations d'amitié existant si heureusement entre nos deux pays.

[E 6677/6677/44] No. 46.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 621.)

Sir, *Angora, November 24, 1926.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 620 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum by Sir Henry Dobbs, High Commissioner for Iraq, on his interviews with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Republic.

2. I fear that the prospects of *bon voisinage*, which these conversations might encourage, have been rather shaken by a statement of Tewfik Rushdi's to Sir Henry Dobbs after dinner last night, to the effect that the Turkish Government were determined to clear the Kurds out of their valleys, the richest part of Turkey to-day, and to settle Turkish peasants there. His Excellency even said that they would be treated as were the Armenians.

3. It is unlikely that the Kurds would suffer this quietly, but, if they are driven out of their country, they can hardly go anywhere save into Persia and Iraq. The problems which such a movement would raise for those two countries may be foreseen, though its effects are more difficult to measure. Tewfik Rushdi was seemingly speaking with all seriousness, but it is hard to believe that such a plan could be carried out on a large scale. If occasion offers, I will try to sound the Minister for Foreign Affairs further on the point.

4. I should add that Sir Henry Dobbs's visit to Angora was most successful. The Turks were genuinely glad to get into personal relations with him, and showed their satisfaction to the best of their ability, while his tact and frankness not only made an excellent impression, but established a friendly basis on which the future relations of Iraq and Turkey, which by force of circumstances are bound to be complicated and occasionally difficult, may, it is to be hoped, be discussed with goodwill on both sides.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

Enclosure in No. 46.

Memorandum.

BEFORE seeing the President I had a short conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of the 21st November.

Tewfik started by saying that he had been anxious to make my personal acquaintance, as there would always be a certain number of frontier incidents between Turkey and Iraq, and it was much easier to settle affairs of this kind when one knew the personality behind the correspondence. He hoped, however, that such incidents would rapidly diminish. The Turkish Government had issued the most stringent orders to their frontier officials to keep the tribes well in hand, and he knew from the information which reached him from Iraq that the Administration there had a very adequate control of the tribesmen. He wished me to realise, however, that the task of his Government was more difficult than that of the Iraq Administration, because the Turkish Government had adopted a policy of dealing direct with individuals and of breaking the power of the chiefs, while Iraq was able to deal with the chiefs and to use their authority over their tribesmen. Turkey had been forced to adopt her present policy, so as to prevent the effect of Russian propaganda in Turkey, not that the Russians deliberately made propaganda against the authority of the Turkish Government, but that the mere existence of the Soviet system on the Turkish frontiers would have operated as revolutionary propaganda had not Turkey forestalled its effect by a liberal and democratic policy.

The chief interest of Turkey was peace, and he was sure that this was also the chief interest of Great Britain, which, being now at her *apogée*, could only desire to consolidate her existing interests. He drew my attention to the excellent results of of a good understanding between Turkey and France on frontier affairs. Since the arrangements made with M. de Jouvenel, Turkey had loyally observed her undertakings on the Syrian frontier, and in consequence Aleppo and Northern Syria were now the only areas in which the French had no need for anxiety.

I replied that I was much gratified by this expression of friendly sentiments and hopes for the future which I entirely reciprocated. I knew that some uneasiness had at one time been felt in Turkish Government circles in regard to the Kurdish policy of the Iraq Administration, and I wished particularly to reassure him on this point. His Excellency was of course aware of the recommendations made by the Council of the League of Nations in regard to the Kurds, who had been assigned to the Iraq Administration. Iraq was bound to carry out these recommendations to the best of her ability, and was therefore pursuing a cautious policy of appointing Kurdish officials as far as possible to predominantly Kurdish tracts and of allowing the use of the Kurdish language. But the Iraq Administration was as completely opposed to all forms of autonomy or separatist nationality for the Kurds as could be either Turkey or Persia, recognising that the Kurds were incapable of unity and that Kurdish independence would only result in brigandage on the borders and the plundering of the districts adjoining the frontiers.

Tewfik said that he was very glad to receive this assurance and that the Turkish Government now felt no uneasiness about the Kurds of Iraq; but they feared that there was still considerable danger from the Persian Kurds on the borders of Shemsdinan, where Persian control was very slack. He then dilated at some length on the inferiority of the Persian army, which he thought quite incapable of maintaining internal security and still less of external defence. Nations like Persia failed, he said, to realise the terrific sacrifices entailed by the upkeep of a modern army, which, in the case of Turkey, devoured a third of her revennes.

I then asked him whether he was satisfied with the conversations of the Permanent Frontier Commission sitting at Zakho. He said yes, that excellent results had been obtained, and that the Turkish representatives had reported that they had found the Iraq representatives most friendly. They had only been unable to settle one point, which I understood (though on this he was not very clear) was the question of transit trade between Turkey and Persia through Iraq. This, he said, would have to await the making of an agreement on the subject between Iraq and Persia.

I said that the disposal of the Goyan (Kurdish) refugees was a question of considerable importance for Iraq. It was impossible for Iraq to remove forcibly from the frontier so large a body of men, and their presence there was a menace to frontier tranquillity. We had been disappointed that Turkey had not been willing to receive them back. Tewfik said that unfortunately they could not meet our wishes in this matter (he gave no reasons); but he was sure that economic conditions would gradually force the Goyan refugees away from the Turkish frontier to gain their livelihood in the plains of Iraq, and the difficulty would probably disappear. I replied that he might be right, but it must be a slow process, and, in the meanwhile, I feared they might be a source of great embarrassment to the two Governments. I did not press the point further, as I understand that they are already beginning to leak back into Turkey without the official cognisance of the Turkish authorities.

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I asked Tewfik whether there was any prospect of the facilitating of trade between Nisibin and Constantinople, since as soon as the Iraq Railway reached Mosul, this would become an important question. He replied that railway developments between Nisibin and Aleppo seemed to be hanging fire badly owing to the financial difficulties of the French company which manages that part of the line. If these difficulties could be got over, Turkey would welcome commercial development.

Tewfik then spoke with great contempt of contemporary Arab tendencies. He said they still chanted songs of the times of Omar and believed that they could revive glories of Herun-al-Rashid and sweep over Asia. They were centuries behind the times. The only Arab ruler with any grip of reality was Ibn Saud, with whom he maintained close relations. Ibn Saud knew that his forces were useless against modern troops, and that he must confine his energies to the Arabian Peninsula. His policy was to keep on good terms with Great Britain owing to the geographical situation, and with Turkey owing to the spiritual and moral influence which Turkey was still able to exercise in those quarters.

After this Tewfik drove me in his car to the house of the President, to whom he introduced me. The President spoke in Turkish and I spoke in French, Tewfik acting as interpreter. The audience lasted nearly two hours and resolved itself into a virtual monologue on the part of the President, stimulated by occasional brief interpolations on my part.

The President seemed to be in a most friendly mood, and frequently smiled in a very attractive way. He started by saying much the same as Tewfik about the benefits of personal acquaintance. Tewfik then repeated to him the substance of what I had said on Kurdish policy. The President replied that he was very glad to hear it. It was all very well to talk of self-determination and the rights of minorities, but these must be subordinated to the rights of existing nations. The Kurds would for many generations be incapable of self-government. He then expressed the same fears as Tewfik about the Persian Kurds on the Shemsdinan border. From this he passed to an exposition of his whole policy. The fault of the East, he said, was its belief in theory and its divorcement from fact. The Turkish Empire had been ruined by its fantastic belief that it could combine all Moslem peoples in one great pan-Islamic union. This had aroused the suspicion of other Powers. In order to avoid a repetition of this absurdity he had abolished the Khalifate. He had always said long before the war that Turkey must get rid of the Albanians, Bulgarians and Arabs, and must become more homogeneous; therefore, recent developments had been entirely in accordance with his policy. But it was a long and uphill task. An English historian had said that the Turkish Empire was behind the Western nations in development by a period equal to that dividing Christ and Mahomet, and all this lost time must now be made up. It was not a question of railways, factories and telegraphs, but a question of fundamentally changing the whole mentality of the people. He trusted that Turkey might receive the benevolent co-operation of Great Britain in the colossal task which lay before her.

I replied that his Excellency would learn the attitude of Great Britain from the lips of the British Ambassador, but that so far as my personal sentiments were concerned, I had always been deeply distressed at the interruption of the ancient friendship between Turkey and Great Britain, and had rejoiced at the recent signs of its re-establishment. I should seize every opportunity in my capacity as High Commissioner for Iraq of consolidating that friendship.

After some further complimentary phrases, I took my leave.

H. DOBBS,
High Commissioner for Iraq

Angora, November 22, 1926.

[E 6878/226/44] No. 47.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 626.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 30, 1926.*

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 620 of the 24th instant regarding my visit to Angora, I have the honour to transmit herewith a leading article* which appeared

* Not printed.

in the "Echo de Turquie," of the 24th November, under the signature of Agha Oglou Ahmed, who is one of the principal leader-writers in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié," the official organ of the Turkish Government.

2. The general tone of the article is in favour of closer relations between Great Britain and Turkey. It will be observed, however, that the effort to bring about a better understanding is expected from Great Britain, while the fact that Turkish xenophobia and administrative incompetence have been the chief impediments hitherto is passed over in silence. Be this as it may, there are signs that this more friendly spirit, even if in words still rather grudgingly shown, is bearing fruit in a more helpful attitude on the part of the authorities where British interests are concerned in this country. Certainly the experience of Mr. Edmonds and Colonel Woods, who accompanied me on my visit to Angora and spent all their time there in Government offices, justifies this hope.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 6796/1002/44] No. 48.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 644.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 8, 1926.*

THE settlement of the outstanding matters connected with the Turco-Greek exchange of populations has been so often announced that it is natural to regard with some scepticism the latest agreement on this subject which has just been signed at Athens. But the satisfaction expressed in the press, under official inspiration, is so considerable that it seems as if matters really had been definitely arranged at last.

2. Pending the publication of the text of the agreement it is impossible to offer any comment of much value, but it may be inferred from statements made here by Greek and Turkish authorities that its main features are the following: It is designed to meet the failure of the Greek Government—as reported in the second paragraph of Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 310 of the 22nd June last—to respect the properties of Moslems who left before the Balkan wars. The aggregate value of Turkish properties in Greece is to be set against the aggregate value of Greek properties in Turkey, Constantinople and Western Thrace presumably remaining excepted. Greece apparently is to be allowed, on payment of compensation, to retain Moslem properties upon which refugees have been settled. Hellenic properties at Constantinople, which had been seized by way of reprisal, and Turkish properties in Western Thrace, are to be restored to their owners. In anticipation of the value of Moslem properties in Greece being greater than the value of Greek properties in Turkey, Greece, it is stated, has agreed to deposit £500,000 sterling to cover the difference. Lastly, some agreement seems to have been reached about the term *établi*.

3. The press has welcomed the agreement very warmly as removing the one great obstacle which lay in the way of really friendly relations developing with Greece. In particular, Yunus Nadi of the "République" points out that once the exchange of population has been effected and the problems incidental thereto settled, there is no reason why the two countries which have been such bitter enemies in the past should not in future live in close friendship, which each so badly needs for its internal recovery. In a semi-official statement Shukri Kaya Bey, the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, utters a warning to all who may be inclined to think that Turkey and Greece are not realist enough to bury the past. M. Tsamados, the Greek Minister, who presented his credentials on the 4th, seems therefore to have appeared at an auspicious moment. In so far as this happier state of affairs is due to conciliation on the part of Turkey, the credit for it must surely be ascribed to M. Mussolini, whose general policy and reputed flirtations with Greece have so alarmed the Angora Government.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[E 6803/59/44] No. 49.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 652.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 8, 1926.*

WITH reference to Mr. Hoare's despatch No. 602 of the 15th November regarding the activities of the Opposition in this country, I have the honour to report that a few days ago Ali Fuad Pasha, who was tried and acquitted at Smyrna last summer, was received by the Ghazi at Angora. According to the official announcement in the press, the interview took place at the request of Ali Fuad.

2. I cannot at this stage express any definite opinion as to the significance of this meeting. There are some who, impressed by the complete victory which the Ghazi has gained over his political opponents, interpret it as a move towards reconciliation undertaken by the Opposition on their own initiative. Reports have appeared in the press to the effect that Adnan Bey, now in London, is preparing to return to Turkey. Another of the Opposition leaders, Hussein Jahid Bey, at the time of the execution of Javid Bey last summer made his peace with the Ghazi and has since been living quietly, and to all appearances contentedly, in Constantinople, engaged in studying possible reforms in the Turkish language. On the strength of these facts, I am told, therefore, that the Opposition have recognised the futility of further struggle and are now prepared to co-operate.

3. If this view is correct, it is, of course, completely at variance with the information reported in Mr. Hoare's despatch under reference. According to Mr. Hoare's informant, the Opposition were quite irreconcilable and were working actively underground. This may indeed be the case, in spite of later developments, for the ways and motives of mankind in this country are hard to fathom. It is certain that the Opposition leaders are not negligible quantities, for at the Smyrna trial their influence with the army, by far the most important factor in Turkey, was proved to be considerable. It can, I think, be regarded as equally certain that they have not lost touch with their sympathisers. If this be so, it is difficult to believe that they would throw in their hand in so complete a fashion as was suggested above. Moreover, from their point of view, a Government feeling itself thoroughly secure would be less likely to offer them good terms.

4. The other explanation is that the overtures have come from the Government. The latter are, on the surface at any rate, complete masters of the situation. They must know the state of feeling in the army, and they must be able to gauge pretty shrewdly the nature and extent of support which their opponents can count upon there. If the latter is increasing, it would be in their interest to scotch it by coming to terms. I would not go so far as to say that the Ghazi is actually alarmed by the position as it now is, but he has a cool head and can see some distance in front of him. It is reasonable to surmise that he may think the present moment the most suitable for offering terms to his enemies. He tried to do away with them last summer and failed; if he cannot lay violent hands on them, an attempt at reconciliation may seem preferable to leaving them with complete independence to work against him in the country.

5. From the point of view of the Opposition, this explanation would offer no insuperable objections. If the Government make overtures to them, that is a sign of their own influence and would strengthen rather than weaken their position. Public opinion does not count: the only thing which really matters is the army, and, if the Opposition are playing a deep game, they will probably be able to see that they do not meanwhile weaken their influence there.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 6945/371/44] No. 50.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 664.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 15, 1926.*

THE Turkish press, yesterday, announced the signature on the 13th December of two separate agreements made by the Turkish Government with a Belgian group on the one hand and a Swedish-Danish group on the other for railway and port construction, of which details were reported to the Department of Overseas Trade by the

commercial secretary to this Embassy in his despatch No. D.O.T. (B) 555/26 of the 8th instant. The agreements now merely require ratification by the Turkish National Assembly in order to become operative. The advantages which Turkey hopes to obtain from them are summarised in a press article, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation herewith.*

2. This morning's press, according to the extract attached,* gives further information reporting that the construction is to be financed in each case by a bond issue, the terms of which only appear to emphasise the risk which the constructing groups run in undertaking the work. It will be observed that the railways are to be completed by the Belgian group in three years, and by the Swedish-Danish group in five years, while the bonds will mature in the first case in six yearly instalments and in the second in ten.

3. From a confidential source I learn that the cost of construction by the Belgian group will be £T. 35,000,000, spread over a period of three years, and £T. 80,000,000 in the case of the Swedish group, spread over five years. According to the press extract already mentioned, the Turkish Government is to pay an annual sum to the Belgians of slightly less than £T. 6,000,000 and to the Swedes of £T. 8,000,000, while the cost of construction for each year is double these amounts. Thus the Turkish Government is, at the lowest estimate, receiving credit in the form of construction to a total value of slightly less than £T. 14,000,000 a year for the first six years and £T. 8,000,000 for the remaining four years.

4. This estimate does not take into account the risk of a Turkish default in the annual payments for redemption of the bonds, or the charges for interest on the capital.

5. The advantages to the Turkish Government of quick construction of railway lines, many of which appear to be in the main strategic, and therefore incapable of repaying the cost of their construction from a commercial standpoint, need no emphasis, while the only corresponding advantage to the constructing companies would seem to lie in the outlet they secure for their material and the profits they hope to make from the sale of the latter.

6. The risk for the capital appears, from the details so far obtained, to be considerable, and Messrs. Pauling would, from their point of view as contractors, be fully justified in refusing the similar terms previously proposed to them by the Turkish Government.

7. The private statement of the Danish Chargé d'Affaires to a member of my staff that he had not been consulted by the Danish group (which is to undertake construction work on behalf of the Swedish suppliers of railway material), and that he was determined not to be held responsible to the Danish investing public for the issue of any bonds for this work, strengthens the presumption that a public issue is to be made, and that, as Mr. Malthe-Brunn said, "the construction companies will get their profits; it is for the financiers or the public to take the risk."

8. It will be interesting to see whether such is the case or whether the companies have obtained sufficient financial backing privately to make a public issue unnecessary. In the latter case, the credit granted by the contracting companies might weaken the chance of an early settlement by the Turkish Government with the bondholders of the Ottoman public debt. If, on the other hand, the agreements have merely been signed by speculative groups in the hope of inducing the public to subscribe to a bond issue in the capitals of Europe, the delay in settling with the Council of Foreign Bondholders will presumably react adversely on any such attempt.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 7063/226/44] No. 51.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 672.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 16, 1926.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the account of the interview which you gave to Yunus Nadi at Lausanne,* as published in to-day's issue of his paper, the "République."

2. It was with some reluctance that I furnished Yunus Nadi with the letter of introduction which procured him the honour of this interview, for he has the reputation

* Not printed.

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of being thoroughly unscrupulous, and in the past his articles have been bitterly and wilfully hostile to Great Britain. Still, he is one of the most influential publicists in Turkey, and his interviews, for instance those which he had with Sir R. Lindsay during the height of the Mosul discussions, have been faithfully rendered.

3. I thought, therefore, that there was nothing to be lost by his hearing your views on Turkey, supposing that you could find time to give him an interview, while there was much to be gained by his hearing a frank and independent opinion on his country from so authoritative a source.

4. I feel that the interview can only do good, coming, as it does, at a time when the Turks are mending their ways in many respects, as, for instance, in the cases of the chambers of commerce and the schools, which have both been satisfactorily settled. And, if it is not unbecoming in me to say so, I venture to think that the concluding reference in the interview to the question of Turkey becoming a member of the League of Nations could not have been put in a more telling form. The Turks are quite ready to use the possibility of membership of the League of Nations as a check on their Soviet friends, all the more because they are under the delusion that the League is pining for their candidature, a belief which in itself makes them suspicious of the League. Nothing therefore could be better than this public and authoritative statement that adherence to the League is a matter entirely for the Turks to consider for themselves. It will dispel many illusions and raise their estimate of the advantages of membership.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.